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The purpose of this report is to outline briefly indigenous peoples’ relationship with 
Canada’s formal political system and the dominant non-indigenous political culture.  
It sketches the historical indigenous-white relationship in Canada, and notes some 
major documents and decisions.  It then illustrates recent post-1945 transformations 
through some of the most important indigenous policy and political outcomes – the 
Northwest Territories’ recent political evolution; reform of Canada’s Constitution 
(both by indigenous politics and British/Canadian law); creation of Nunavut; and the 
impact of active indigenous internationalism.  Finally the report moves to discussion 
and observations drawing in part on the Canadian national election of 2000; and ends 
with conclusions or an Executive Summary, pp. 43-49. The observations and 
conclusions reflect on all of Canada, a general summing-up, while the four cases 
described are chosen for their richness in illustrating aspects of that generality – and 
for the author’s familiarity with them.  The report attempts to contextualise national 
political systems (including elections and political parties) at work vis-à-vis 
indigenous politics and peoples to show how Canada’s process-oriented and steadily 
evolving national and indigenous political cultures shape and are shaped by these. 
 
In this report I am not interested in the good intentions or official motives of the 
general public or white-run governments.  Those were well known and well 
publicised at the time, and were usually the sole indigenous news source for 
Canadians until the native movement found voice and gained media access in the 
1970s.  Rather, I am interested in outcomes or perceptions of non-indigenous actions 
and policies on indigenous politics; in ways with which indigenous peoples engaged 
the White Man’s political order in response; and in new political inter-actions and 
structures resulting.  In Russia, for instance, some of the Czars had endless good ideas 
and happy thoughts about how to better the lives of indigenous Siberians, but these 
                                                           
1 King George III in his Royal Proclamation of 1763 addresses the need to respect ‘the 
several Nations or Tribes of Indians with whom We are connected’. 
2 An earlier draft of this paper with same title appears abridged in Challenging Politics: 
Indigenous Peoples’ Experiences with Political Parties and Elections, ed. Kathrin Wessendorf, 
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had almost no impact ‘on the ground’ except, frequently, results opposite to their 
intent.  In Canada some officials and former officials have been unable to distinguish 
between noble motives in one place and culture, and flawed outcomes reported from 
another, despite the fact that they are clearly two separate (and sometimes almost 
unrelated) situations, and despite deeply different subjectivities in play in each. 
 
One purpose of this paper is to show that what has been happening in indigenous 
affairs in recent decades and in large regions of Canada has not been a series of 
momentary concessions or exceptions in public policy.  Rather, these represent a new 
political culture and new policy emerging.  There are several reasons why this is 
important.  One is that rather than constantly force indigenous peoples and hinterlands 
to confront a rough and rude frontier ethic with resource extraction as core value and 
sole interest, we should pay attention to lessons they have already taught us and 
consciously make policy accommodate reality.  The ‘hazing’ or ‘initiation’ rites 
forced by our old values on indigenous peoples opting into the economic and social 
opportunities and accessing the politico-legal structures as equals in Canada are 
inappropriate, unnecessary, and demeaning.4  A second reason is that Canadians 
spend too much time believing morosely that significant or urgent constitutional 
politics and reform, and accommodations of regional, economic, and cultural 
difference, are somehow beyond them.  However, recent decades in indigenous 
politics and hinterlands prove otherwise. 
 
A third reason weighs heavily with the author from many years talking and working 
with indigenous leaders and organisations in North America, Europe, and Australia.  
Many whites, even some with open minds and goodwill, see indigenous ethno-
political demands and actions as essentially formless, incoherent, and endless.  
Meanwhile many indigenous persons and organisations see indigenous relations with 
non-indigenous society, and indigenous-government relations, as futile and 
unrewarding.  What follows here should demonstrate that both those perceptions are 
wrong, and that much good is happening, much has happened, and much more can 
happen.  Yes, many difficulties remain, but things are not hopeless.  There is still 
some ‘slack’, and quite a lot of flexibility, in ‘the system’.  This is important for 
indigenous peoples tackling myriad problems left, by centuries of white impact as 
plainly identified by, e.g., Irwin (1989), Boldt (1993), and Taiaiake Alfred (1999). 
 
According to Icelandic sagas the first Europeans landed and met indigenous peoples 
in what is now Canada in AD 1000 (Gad 1971; Jones 1986; Wallace 2000).  Erik the 
Red, expelled from Iceland, named and settled Greenland in AD 985.  His son Leif 
Eriksen then sailed to Nunavut, Labrador, and the island of Newfoundland in AD 
1000.  The story gains credibility from the discovery c. 1960 of a sturdy Norse camp 
of the type and at the place described – on Newfoundland’s great northern peninsula 
by the Strait of Belle Isle.  ‘Leif’s booths’, now a World Heritage Site, established his 
right to call and lead a political assembly under Norse customary law.  ‘Vineland’, 
which Leif is said to have found, could be a chronicler’s Biblical witticism about the 
Promised Land (Jones 1986, 283-285), or, as Wallace (2000) proposes, the Bay of 
Chaleur and Acadian New Brunswick.  Leif’s political rights reportedly led to his 
sister murdering other Norse whom she found encroaching at the ‘booths’ later.  Back 
home in Greenland she was kept out of sight while Leif, as national leader after his 
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father’s death, hushed up her murders, the sagas tell us – white North America’s first 
white political cover-up.  Innu Indians killed Leif’s brother who is buried in Labrador.  
Archeology and other scholarship continue to reveal surprises in the Norse America 
story (Seaver 2000; Wallace 2000; Schledermann 2000). 
 
What would one expect of those Viking times?  Leif Eriksen et al. disdained the Inuit 
and Indian peoples they met, lumping them all together as ‘skraelings’.5  Whatever 
their ambitions in North America, the Norse neither included nor dealt peacefully nor 
profitably with the natives – politically, socially, economically, or religiously.  (Leif 
and friends were zealous Christian converts in some accounts.)  The Norse 
communities in Greenland later failed for lack of peaceful relations with Inuit or 
adoption of successful Inuit strategies for food and shelter.  Now, a thousand years 
later, we are debating terms of Inuit and Innu inclusion or autonomy in Labrador; the 
Inuit government of Nunavut is ending its second year; and Newfoundland island’s 
indigenes are extinct.6  We now acknowledge that Europe’s impact has been a disaster 
for indigenous peoples.  We are also picking up the pieces of indigenous Christian 
institutionalisation.  Were Norse settlement and exploration in the north-west Atlantic 
really heroic efforts, as taught in school, or a pattern whose failure was repeated by 
Europeans around the world for 1000 years? (Jull 1998b)  Since 1945, and especially 
since the 1960s, European peoples and countries have begun to recognise positively 
the unique status of peoples they have conquered or annexed.  Change has only 
begun, but one of its clearest international proponents has been a Norwegian prime 
minister in her World Report on Environment and Development (Brundtland 1987), 
while the indigenous Sami in Norway and adjoining countries now look with active 
interest at the Canadian processes described in this paper (George 2001). 
 
 
European impact from c. 1500 
 
Whales and cod drew Europeans to the waters off Canada and Greenland before the 
1492 voyage of Columbus to the Caribbean.  In 1497 the first Cabot voyage launched 
the British Empire, adding Newfoundland and ‘Red Indians’ (the Beothucks) to 
European consciousness.  From 1534, Jacques Cartier made attempts to trade with and 
settle in Canada.  Permanent settlements were achieved from the early 1600s by 
Champlain.  Fisheries conducted by Europeans had sometimes involved fish-drying 
and indigenous contacts ashore.  Soon fur became the great trade – with indigenous 
peoples the producers.  Ray (1996) shows the continuity between the beginnings of 
Europe in Canada then and the indigenous-shaped Canadian North now. 
 
The French rule in Eastern and Southern Canada to 1760 rested lightly on indigenous 
peoples, contrary to earlier Anglophone propaganda (Jaenen 1991).  After the end of 
the long wars with France, The Royal Proclamation of 1763 became the basic 
constitutional document for British rule and for indigenous-white relations (Miller 
2000, 86-90).  It shapes public policy to this day and has been given renewed force at 
indigenous insistence in Canada’s Constitution Act 1982, Section 25a. 
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Van Kirk (1981) recovers a lost Canada with its multi-cultural society – indigenous, 
white, and mixed (or métis) – spread across the centre and west of the continent.  In 
those early days there were many indigenous nations with distinct languages or 
dialects and local protocols for trade and other relations, connected by riverine trade 
routes ‘manned’ by indigenous, French, Scottish, Irish, métis and others.  (At least one 
European girl slipped in, disguised as a boy, until she inconveniently gave birth and 
was sent home.)  Ties across racial lines were mutually advantageous to indigenous 
and white; marriages in European ritual or à la façon du pays (‘in the fashion of the 
country’) were frequent.  The few whites could not ‘use’ and discard native girls – 
days of such exploitation were far in the future.  Whites were a small minority 
tolerated by indigenous hosts.  Trading fur was attractive to all sides.  One sees two 
enduring and competing archetypes of Canadian society in the far-travelling traders in 
fast canoes vs. the sedentary routine of seaside posts embodied in the North West 
Company and Hudson’s Bay Company respectively.  Both were profitable. 
 
The end of fur trade dominance and indigenous partnership came early in the 19th 
century, recounted in its painful intimate personal outcomes by Van Kirk (1981).  The 
Victorian world of stern Protestant effort, Social Darwinism, and industrial ‘advance’ 
accompanied by the railway – that inexorable White Man’s7 advance and ‘progress’ 
we were taught in Canadian schools until recent years – now begins to become both a 
reality and an intellectual construction.  The whole history of indigenous-white 
relations is provided by Miller (2000).  From the end of the War of 1812, and the end 
of the two fur companies’ war of the woods in 1821 when the companies merged, 
indigenous status and power declined.  Powerful mobile bands of war allies, fur 
producers, and traders treated as equals by whites now became local nuisances 
occupying lands wanted by ‘industrious’ white farmers and town-builders.  Even the 
isolated Pacific coast was brought into the imperial, Victorian, and industrial worlds 
soon after James Douglas founded Fort Victoria with his indigenous wife near mid-
century.  Gold rushes then brought stampedes of hopeful men and a few women from 
many lands, notably California, leaving Douglas’ attempts to create a fair and bi-
racial British Columbia (BC) simply overwhelmed (Fisher 1977).  Miller notes (2000, 
134) that 1846 saw ‘the last occasion on which the Indian Department would 
negotiate change with First Nations in eastern Canada’ after which white domination 
was total.  In 1850 the Indian Act appeared:  ‘The truly significant feature of this 
statute was that civil government, an agency beyond the control of Indians, a body in 
which Indians were not even eligible to have representation, arrogated to itself the 
authority to define who was or was not Indian.’ (Ibid, 138).  The imposition of dour 
white Victorian purpose on the scattered and increasingly marginalised indigenous 
peoples across Canada continued into the 1960s.  Many adults today bear its scars 
every day of their lives.  Nevertheless, ‘In the nineteenth century, as a sort of obverse 
of British imperial expansion, [white indigenous support] bodies developed that 
sought first the emancipation of non-white colonial populations and later their 
protection from whites in their own homelands’ (Miller 2000, 111). 
 
Not surprisingly the epitome of control was the residential school (Miller 1996).  Few 
of the older indigenous leaders in Canada today escaped its direct effects.  In some 
cases, such as the school for Inuit in Churchill on Hudson Bay, an ironic effect of 
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gathering the bright youth of many districts was that shared experience and long hours 
of talk in confinement formed them into a future political leadership who would defy, 
defeat, and replace white paternalism. 
 
For 150 years indigenous peoples were confined, regulated, and oppressed, most 
living on small reserves – the entire political and constitutional apparatus weighted 
against them.  In the later 19th century the political and administrative absorption of 
the vast North-West transferred by Britain to Canada – the previous Hudson’s Bay 
Company territory – brought a proliferation of new arrangements and policies which 
reinforced ‘control’ as indigenous policy principle (Miller 2000, 197-98).  In northern 
areas Sub-Arctic and Arctic peoples, notably Dene, Cree, Innu (a.k.a. Naskapi-
Montagnais), and Inuit were less confined and often ignored.  Indian first nations 
could not vote unless individuals went through formal processes to disown and 
separate from their culture and people, as a mere 250 did in the period 1857-1920 
(Miller 2000, 255).  After Indians got the vote from the Diefenbaker Conservative 
government in 1960 they could vote in Canada’s ‘first past the post’ elections in 
single-member ridings.  Over time some communities were able to use this lever with 
some effect, as we will see.  However, by and large Indians on reserves, i.e., First 
Nations,8 had influence on very few matters assigned by the archaic and patronising 
Indian Act.  Many personal matters such as trips off the reserve were controlled by 
white Indian agents.  Canadian opinion polls on indigenous policy have been 
deceptive.  For those aged in our 50s or older, the indigenous ‘problem’ has been too 
much control by government; for many younger people more positive government 
activity seems desirable.  Both groups are sympathetic to indigenous peoples.  Their 
attitudes hastened change from the 1960s. 
 
 
The Post-War Era 
 
The Depression, Second World War, and Cold War laid foundations for a new 
indigenous-white relationship in Canada.  The war similarly brought large impacts to 
indigenous Australia, Greenland, Alaska, Sápmi,9 European Russia, and Siberia, 
including new technologies and even egalitarian ‘ordinary blokes’ from unpretentious 
new societies.  Confident materialism became the answer to human ills, an extension 
of gung-ho wartime spirit.  The long postwar economic boom and public shame at 
racial disadvantage helped to fuel indigenous and hinterland policy in Canada.  
Education was most important, giving greater numbers of indigenous persons means 
to deal more confidently with the White Man’s culture, myths, and society – and 
showing that practice in white relations with Métis, Inuit, and Indian First Nations 
was far short of stated Canadian ideals. 
 
The North became an important new myth.  Its great expanse – made greater by 
Mercator projection maps in schools and offices – was an emptiness where national 
energy and purpose could create technical marvels and population centres, in the way 
Americans were imagining the Moon and Mars.  These visions were notable in two 
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Nation’s reserve lands, even if absent in large cities.  In some areas such as the Pacific coast 
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ways:  they were material achievements, and there was too little understanding of 
Inuit, Indian nations, and Métis who lived there.10  In one memorable federal 
government film, The North Has Changed, c. 1967, we begin with an indigenous 
hunter in skin boat silently crossing a northern lake when an explosion ends the scene 
and fast-paced music brings us to noisy construction and extraction sites.  Dynamiting 
the Native North was how many indigenous people saw (or experienced) the policy of 
that era.  With bumptious goodwill and ignorance Canada’s national government 
poured money into the two northern territories and Arctic Québec.  After 1960 
nationalist governments in Québec rejected and replaced federal roles in Arctic 
Québec, while in the Northwest Territories (NWT) and Yukon indigenous political 
movements targeted social discrimination, political disadvantage, and environmental 
damage.  (See below for NWT; and Coates 1991 for Yukon.) 
 
Non-indigenous people knew that indigenous conditions nationwide were bad but had 
little idea of precisely what to do, or how to do it.  However, they were sure that 
Ottawa should do something!  But as with any great change in national direction and 
outlook, Ottawa was divided like the rest of the country.  Canada’s vast hinterland, 
i.e., homeland to the most intact indigenous cultures, was seen variously as a treasure 
chest of presumed mineral wealth to be kept locked for federal government use only; 
as a game and cultural preserve where science boffins could conduct interesting 
studies in a living museum; or as proto-provinces which needed to be brought along in 
conventional Canadian ways.  Northern white leaders favoured only the last of those 
and indigenous leaders favoured none of the above.  When the indigenous peoples 
were ready to put forward their own proposals in following years, they won (but that 
seemed unrealistically hopeful from the vantage of the 1960s).  Ottawa had certain 
assets:  a large and highly educated population inside and outside government with 
most of the documentation and much of the expertise in Canada on indigenous policy 
at its disposal.  It might move slowly, but when it had to move it would dig more 
deeply and work through issues more thoroughly than ‘the boys’ at Canadian Legion 
halls11 of an evening, or Pacific Coast talkback radio ‘personalities’.  On indigenous 
issues federal MPs of all parties (before the new populist opposition parties) were 
committed to real change and an end to injustice, and comfortably ignored party lines 
when agreeing on reports and proposals. 
 
The biggest problems however were deeper and found in individual perceptions.  At a 
political level, there had to be a transition or lurch from peoples administered to 
peoples freely self-governing.  Inuit welcomed much of the White Man’s intervention, 
frankly, often saying that old age pensions, or the Mounties’ presence ending the 
blood feuds in some districts, were of unquestionable benefit.  They would then also 
enumerate many problems brought by the recent paternalistic administration.  It was 
very hard for officials to give up control which, at its most dramatic, was seen as a 
question of saving the lives of sickness- and starvation-ravaged Inuit.  Distance and 
culture also meant that there was unlimited scope for utter misunderstanding of each 
other’s outlook and intentions between, say, Ottawa officials and Inuit hunters, a 
problem of which the ‘High Arctic Exiles’ has been an unhappy case in point (Jull 
1994).  Official intentions descended through many layers and hands before 
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enactment, sometimes leaving local white administrators as bewildered as peoples by 
Arctic sea or Sub-Arctic river, none having a true sense of official motives other than 
the rumours which floated around the North as a principal form of entertainment until 
the advent of television. 
 
When the Government of Canada’s 1969 white paper on Indian policy had the 
opposite effect of its intention – uniting indigenous people from coast to coast behind 
a rights agenda and against assimilation – action became urgent (Weaver 1981).  That 
was the era of the first charismatic young modern indigenous leader whom the general 
Canadian public got to ‘know’, Harold Cardinal, a man whose wit, words, and best-
selling book The Unjust Society (an ironic comment on Prime Minister Trudeau’s 
‘Just Society’ slogan) were more than a match in the TV age for plodding 
governments (Cardinal 1969).  Soon the Supreme Court of Canada would begin re-
establishing equality in white-indigenous relations through land, sea, and hunting 
rights cases, and treaty cases.  But the depth of public ignorance was revealed when 
‘mainstream’12 Southern media took a long-term interest in the 1975-77 Berger 
inquiry into a proposed pipeline to carry Arctic Ocean gas through Western Arctic 
Inuit (Inuvialuit) and Dene territories to Southern Canada and the USA (see below).  
News reports were often baffling, raising more questions than they answered for those 
who knew the North.  However, the Berger inquiry became a national ‘teach-in’ and a 
turning-point in national consciousness.  Most importantly it introduced many 
Northern indigenous voices and their needs to the Canadian public. 
 
 
Part 2 – Some Major Episodes 
 
 
1. The Northwest Territories (NWT) 
 
Arriving in North America from temperate climates of Western Europe, the first white 
fishers, traders, settlers, and adventurers found a deceptively pleasant continent rich in 
resources of many kinds and basking in early summer.  However, winter revealed a 
ferocious climate.  Latitudes were misleading – the southerly reach of cold ocean 
currents and Hudson Bay made Canada quite unlike coastal Europe.  Much trial and 
error – and loss of life – accompanied Canada’s early European settlement. 
 
Indigenous peoples in large numbers could easily control white contacts and 
incursions, able to vanish into rocky wilderness or forest, or suddenly to re-appear.  
While European nobles, capitalists, promoters, and dreamers conjured images of new 
wealth and fine new cities to arise when lands were transformed magically by the 
White Man, realities were often disappointing.  In Elizabethan times even Sir Philip 
Sidney fell for Martin Frobisher’s ‘fool’s gold’ from Nunavut, while Raleigh lost 
much more in settlement attempts farther south.  French, British, and other Europeans 
were transfixed by ‘the New World’, evoking it magically from afar as in Marvell’s 
poem ‘Bermudas’ or Dürer’s excitement at the beauty of indigenous treasures brought 
back to the Holy Roman Emperor by Spain’s conquistadors from Mexico.  
Shakespeare was closer to the mark with his account of indigenous-white relations in 
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The Tempest where bad old ways poison human relations and society in faraway new 
places.  Governor Winthrop’s great on-board sermon envisioning white settlement as 
‘a City upon a Hill’ was soon forgotten in Massachusetts when he and others bloodily 
exterminated various New England Indians. 
 
From 1945 those first themes of colonising history, politics, and identity were 
confronted anew when the pragmatic materialism and equality ideals of Depression- 
and War-weary Canada turned northwards.  The experience of the Northwest 
Territories has been both an illustration and an epicentre of indigenous political 
change (Jull 1984; Cameron & White 1995).  It reveals contradictions and confusion 
in Canadian political culture, but also an ability to respond creatively.  With political 
determination a small number of isolated, mostly illiterate, and scattered hunter-
gatherers won great victories and re-wrote the script of indigenous-white relations 
(Jull 1997; 2000a; 2000b). 
 
The NWT was 34% of Canada’s land area until Nunavut’s creation in 1999.  The 
1996 NWT population (including Nunavut) was merely 64, 402 out of Canada’s total 
28.8 million.  With the census taken in summer the northern total and the proportion 
of non-indigenous people is swollen by skilled tradespeople and other visitors.  Inuit, 
Dene, and Métis comprised an indigenous majority.  With Nunavut withdrawn the 
rump NWT is estimated now to have a small majority of non-indigenous people. 
 
The NWT was ‘left over’ from earlier nation-building processes.  Its vastness had 
been repeatedly diminished by creation or extension of provinces whose boundaries 
were drawn neatly and arbitrarily with no regard to traditional territories, interests, or 
views of indigenous peoples.  After the Yukon was created in 1898 to provide closer 
administration of the Klondike Gold Rush, the NWT comprised two vast regions.  
One was the tundra, coasts, glaciers, and islands which stretched from the bottom of 
Hudson Bay to near the North Pole and westward along the Arctic coast, the ancient 
homeland of Inuit.  The other, lying south and west of that Inuit region, was the 
system of huge lakes and many rivers flowing into the Mackenzie (Deh Cho) and 
Coppermine Rivers which empty into the Arctic Ocean.  These Sub-Arctic forests are 
the homeland of Dene (or ‘Athapaskan’) peoples, as well as the mixed-blood Métis of 
more recent times.  Fur trading from the late 18th and resource industry projects from 
the mid-20th centuries, together with missionaries and ‘Mounties’ (Canada’s federal 
police13), followed later by government administrators, had built up several large 
settlements or small towns, notably Yellowknife, Hay River, Fort Smith, and Inuvik.  
Yellowknife, a gold mining, aviation, and supply centre became the NWT capital in 
1967 because it had a diversity of other roles and would not be overwhelmed, it was 
hoped, by the infusion of bureaucracy. 
 
In the 1950s many Canadians were nervous about the American Cold War presence in 
the North posing risks for Canadian sovereignty.  They were also stung by American 
criticism of Canada’s treatment of Inuit whose famine deaths were bringing 
unwelcome world attention (Harrington 2000; Tester & Kulchyski 1994).  A new 
federal Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources was created – later re-
organised and renamed Indian Affairs and Northern Development or DIAND.  In the 
late 1950s a Conservative leader broke the long Liberal hold on national government 
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to become prime minister.  His Northern ‘vision’ included ‘roads to resources’, a 
program of dirt roads built and many more surveyed for the future.  An able Northern 
Affairs minister and many fresh ideas, including introducing ‘co-ops’ (producer and 
retail co-operatives) to Inuit communities, helped transform the North into something 
more like North America’s material norm.14 
 
Indigenous people were not participants, however, their ‘backward’ ways, traditional 
languages, and hunting economy being seen as obstacles to the White Man’s superior 
and benevolent purposes.  This denigration fuelled a political agenda driven by 
everyday resentment, e.g., the best houses and best jobs going to transient whites.  It 
was the first generation of able indigenous young who became fluent in English in 
northern schools who demanded and won respect for their parents and indigenous 
culture.  Often those young people themselves lacked traditional culture beyond their 
childhood memories of the old life ‘on the land’, making them seek more urgently to 
rescue ways which were now disappearing.  But it was their parents whose knowledge 
and outrage at the White Man’s next assault – on the land and seas themselves by 
transport, resource exploration, and construction activities – provided the catalyst for 
a political movement centred on land rights and land claims.  These claims included 
freshwater – and for Inuit, the sea. 
 
At the end of the 1960s a recognisable and articulate native movement in the North 
appeared.  A white ‘action research’ specialist who had worked in the Mackenzie 
Delta among Inuvialuit and Dene, Paul Lumsden, became an Ottawa official helping 
to achieve ‘core funding’ for indigenous political associations across the North and 
across Canada (Lumsden 1987).  In retrospect ‘core funding’ by which indigenous 
groups received predictable multi-year funding may have been Canada’s key reform.  
It enabled indigenous representatives across Canada to work full-time articulating 
their peoples’ needs and seeking better policies and a remedy to injustices.  It was 
approved by Prime Minister Trudeau and Cabinet because it provided the voice in 
government affairs which the small numbers of indigenous peoples could not achieve 
through election of sympathetic spokespersons or their own representatives in 
Parliament.  Lumsden’s Citizenship Branch argued that the North was part of Canada, 
and that indigenous peoples everywhere were Canadians, too, and for both reasons 
deserved opportunities to work for the improvement of their communities which were 
largely unrepresented in the ‘mainstream’ political system. 
 
The first such NWT organisation, the Committee for Original Peoples Entitlement 
(COPE) in the Mackenzie Delta, hoped to unite Inuit, Dene, and Métis, but Ottawa 
decided to fund separate Indian first nations, Métis (and non-status Indians), and Inuit 
bodies in each province and territory.  COPE became a regional organisation for Inuit 
and in 1984 achieved a Western Arctic land claims settlement – with work still 
proceeding today on regional and local government structures.  An Indian 
Brotherhood later to be renamed the Dene Nation, and a Métis Association, were 
formed in Denendeh, while the Inuit regions outside COPE’s area would later become 
Nunavut with three regional organisations under a national Inuit association, Inuit 
Tapirisat of Canada (ITC).  ITC also included Labrador and Quebec Inuit, but its 
focus was Nunavut.  Through creation of special subsidiary bodies it negotiated 
Nunavut claims and self-government from 1976 to 1993. 
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The differences between Denendeh and Nunavut were many.  Denendeh bore the full 
brunt of the White Man’s settlement, resource development, and construction 
projects.  Already in the early 1960s the federal government in Ottawa decided with 
bi-partisan support to split Denendeh from the Inuit areas of the east.  The Inuit and 
their region were slow to develop, it was said, and it would be better to allow the 
Mackenzie region of Denendeh to move ahead faster (Robertson 2000).  There was 
even a coat of arms drawn up for a new Inuit territory, ‘Nunassiaq’, but the whole 
idea was dropped, partly because Inuit had not been consulted.  (When Inuit 
themselves later proposed Nunavut within similar boundaries to ‘Nunassiaq’, 
however, this was seen as dangerous separatism by many white officials!)  Dene, 
Inuit, and Métis were in broad agreement on the need for land claims settlements, 
greater environmental control of resource and other development projects threatening 
their livelihoods and food species’ habitats, and indigenous self-government.  They 
also agreed on the failure of first federal and, after 1967, the Northwest Territories 
government to design and implement cultural, social, and environmental programs 
appropriate to indigenous peoples. 
 
On the one hand the White Man was pouring money and improvements into the NWT 
for indigenous benefit, but indigenous people generally felt disoriented by and 
sceptical towards so much change.  Furthermore, white workers and their families 
moving in from the South seemed to get the greatest benefit.  The scattered camps and 
seasonal movements of indigenous peoples were largely replaced by unhappy new 
settlements where indigenous people were living in little houses in rows watched over 
by young white administrators with all power over their lives.  With population now 
concentrated, any hunting had to be within reach so areas near villages were quickly 
over-hunted, leaving older people with little familiar activity or meaning in their lives. 
 
The NWT was imagined by the best minds and hearts in Ottawa as a model region 
which, unlike the disastrous experience of the slaughter of the buffalo (i.e., bison) and 
marginalisation on reserves of Prairie indigenous peoples, would see indigenous 
people as well as whites sharing new communities and jobs in a mineral resources 
boom.  The North would be happy, prosperous, and multi-racial.  There were also 
dreams of high-tech solutions, including a bubble dome over Frobisher Bay townsite 
(Martin Frobisher’s locale which has now become Iqaluit, the Nunavut capital) under 
which even palm trees might grow!  Something successfully multi-racial has now 
happened, but rather differently, and with different assumptions.  For one thing 
indigenous peoples are not an undifferentiated mass of backwardness, but a 
patchwork of peoples and cultures across the NWT, each with its own language or 
dialect, and unique traditions, and aspirations.  Furthermore, white ideas about 
‘northern development’ have not been superior.  Material visions – building up, 
digging out, blasting through – came to seem mindless vandalism, and social 
intentions to seem paternalistic.  Indigenous northerners hired white experts and 
lawyers to get those messages through to environmental panels, courts, parliaments, 
and ministers.  In the process they highlighted their own knowledge of Arctic and 
Sub-Arctic eco-systems. 
 
While the federal government and its creation, the NWT government, wanted to 
overlook differences among people and ignore legislation like the Indian Act in search 
of a new equality, indigenous peoples saw such measures as the bare minimum 
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recognition of their status and ‘native rights’.  They fought hard to keep such 
recognition and, far from supporting assimilation, they wanted rather to build new 
political structures supporting and enhancing their languages and cultures. 
 
In the mid-1960s the federal government moved to strengthen its indigenous political 
vision.  For the first time there would be elections in what is now Nunavut for three 
Arctic seats newly created in the NWT Council.  (The Council was made up of both 
federally appointed and locally elected members, the former being often more socially 
progressive.)  However, few Inuit understood what was at stake and in two of the new 
seats whites fluent in the Inuit language were elected without anyone else running 
against them.  Both turned out to be excellent and articulate representatives – one was 
world-renowned scholar and author on Inuit and Circumpolar studies, RG 
Williamson.  The third seat was won by Simonie Michael, an Inuk of Iqaluit.  Among 
the appointed members were also one Inuk and one Dene. 
 
Ottawa had appointed a commission to recommend future political structures and 
programs for the NWT.  This Carrothers Report (1966) was a landmark.  Devoted to 
finding ways to ensure that indigenous peoples were not marginalised in politics or 
society, it cleared the way for creation of a full NWT government rather than the two 
field administrations for Denendeh in Fort Smith and for Nunavut (and Arctic 
Quebec) in Ottawa.  The Northern Affairs Branch in Ottawa would be scaled back 
and most jobs moved to the new capital, Yellowknife.  The report’s economic 
development proposals were ignored.  However, the call for fully elaborated local 
councils and local government to be the centrepiece of indigenous social and political 
development was heeded.  Indeed, the huge commitment of Ottawa and Yellowknife 
in funds, new buildings, and personnel was astounding.  The new bodies, each with a 
meeting hall, offices, and a strange new coat of arms (usually displaying Arctic 
wildlife in biologically impossible or improbable poses) provided places for Inuit, 
Dene, and Métis to master new skills.  However, when they realised that they were 
only going to be allowed to ‘practise’ limited decision-making for needs they had 
never worried about, e.g. street lamps, disillusionment set in.  The immediate result 
was a more general turning to land rights and self-government, i.e., to the native 
movement, to achieve political goals. 
 
From 1968 the ‘frontier resources’ frenzy in Canada saw tremendous pressure by 
government and industry to explore, develop, ship, and market NWT oil, gas, and 
minerals.  Indigenous peoples worked through their ‘core funded’ political 
associations as well as the courts, Southern Canada media, national church groups, 
and other bodies to oppose development of their territories until indigenous land 
ownership was settled and proper environmental safeguards put in place.  This 
seemed a radical agenda from a radical extra-parliamentary group to most Canadians.  
It became much less radical and much more threatening in 1973 when the Supreme 
Court of Canada found in Calder that indigenous native title rights existed in principle 
in all parts of Canada.15  (Much of Canada’s indigenous rights experience is found 
readably contextualised in Tennant 1990.)  A successful 1970s question of aboriginal 
rights in the NWT courts, Re Paulette, was an immense stimulus to Dene and Métis 
determination, undermining Indian Treaty 11, albeit a finding struck down on appeal. 
                                                           
15 That is, where such rights had not been extinguished by clear and plain law, such as 
treaties or federal statutes, or by development which removed indigenous use in fact, like 
locating a city on former hunting land. Mabo 1992 and Wik 1996 in Australia are similar. 
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In 1968, too, another milestone occurred.  Pierre Trudeau who had newly succeeded 
Lester Pearson as Liberal prime minister called an election and visited Yellowknife 
during the campaign.  Trudeau spoke in a packed school hall where only about two 
indigenous persons – an Indian chief on stage and a Métis government clerk in the 
audience – were present.  While Northern affairs minister Laing gave his usual 
resource development speech, Trudeau said that his northern priority was social 
policy.  In answer to a question he said that he was prepared to negotiate new NWT 
constitutional arrangements.  Any comfort whites had from the hope of more power in 
the NWT was more than mitigated by his social policy commitment, a term well 
understood as code for indigenous interests and aspirations.  Trudeau’s candidate won 
the seat.  For once northerners had been able to vote on northern policy. 
 
The 1970s were a time of anger and dispute in the NWT.  There was a breakdown of 
indigenous-white relations at the very time when many young Dene, Inuit, and Métis 
were coming out of school with ‘mainstream’ skills.  The new NWT government was 
under firm control by an Ottawa-appointed Commissioner, Stu Hodgson, a big man 
for a big job.  Slowly but steadily during the decade more power was shared with 
members of the elected NWT Council (which optimistically renamed itself NWT 
Legislative Assembly).  The NWT government did not acknowledge the indigenous 
political associations, and they in turn regarded the government as the unacceptable 
and authoritarian face of the White Man’s colonialism.  There were a few indigenous 
persons elected, but most indigenous leaders called for a boycott of the Legislative 
Assembly.  Ottawa was moving imperceptibly towards a position where it would 
require, in effect, the agreement of both indigenous organisations and the elected 
assembly on constitutional and rights issues. 
 
But a federal election in 1972 brought an omen of the future, one from which 
indigenous peoples and their friends took heart.  Despite the tight white hegemony in 
the NWT and its institutions, and the denial by those in power in Yellowknife of 
indigenous rights or cultural imperatives, an indigenous candidate won the federal 
seat of NWT.  More importantly, his campaign posters ignored his party label (NDP, 
or ‘labour’) and simply said ‘Our land, our man’ while his obviously indigenous face 
filled the rest of the poster, with ‘Vote Wally Firth’ at the bottom.  It was a plain 
challenge to the White Man’s political system, but one using the mainstream system 
and drawing the pan-indigenous vote regardless of conventional political labels.  
Firth, a popular but reclusive radio broadcaster from a well-known Métis family, got 
votes from all peoples.  Liberals and Conservatives who had always won the seat 
previously had to accept that a new social agenda and a challenge to white supremacy 
were emerging.  Firth won again in the next election.  (In recent times the seat has 
been comfortably held by a Dene woman, Ethel Blondin, a federal Liberal cabinet 
minister.) 
 
In the mid-1970s the Berger commission was set up by Ottawa to resolve a 
fundamental NWT conflict (Berger 1977).  A pipeline to carry Beaufort Sea gas 
through Inuvialuit and Dene lands along the Mackenzie River to Southern Canada and 
US markets was opposed by indigenous peoples on environmental and social grounds, 
but eagerly sought by the NWT government and white business people.  This conflict, 
Judge Berger’s patient style, community meetings in rough cabins, the anger and 
wisdom of indigenous persons speaking through interpreters, and glib company 
– Jull: ‘Nations with whom We are connected’, 3rd ed. – Page 13 – 
representatives all provided a long-running national drama.  For the first time the 
national media were revealing the real North, the indigenous North.  It was a place of 
many locales, of homely concerns of almost unknown peoples – a place unlike the 
‘empty’ spaces which Canadians imagined.  These hearings and public disputes 
became a turning-point.  The whole issue of hinterland development became a 
national political issue in which all Canadians were involved.  Literally it was such an 
issue, one for resolution by legislation of the national Parliament.  It became a vessel 
into which environmental and progressive social interests poured their idealism.  
Canadians now found themselves having to choose between a powerful arrogant 
system acting in their name to make money out of further disadvantage to some very 
poor indigenous people, and, the environmental needs (and daily livelihoods), 
cultures, and society of those people.  The Trudeau government was not so unwise as 
to overlook Berger’s eloquent recommendations.  Berger’s report quickly became an 
international classic on indigenous-white relations (Berger 1977). 
 
But now the NWT whites and government felt bypassed and mistreated, and 
threatened to organise a public inquiry on constitutional progress as recommended by 
Carrothers for the 10-year anniversary of his commission’s work.  Ottawa, anxious to 
avoid further inflaming race relations, decided to appoint a special representative, 
senior former cabinet minister Bud Drury.  Drury’s preference for discreet private 
consultations was understandable as an Establishment figure but out of keeping with 
the times and with the mistrust of Northern indigenous leaders who boycotted his 
work.  Nevertheless, when his report was released in early 1980, delayed by a national 
political crisis, the fall of the Clark government, and an election, its quiet but damning 
criticism of the operations and style of the NWT government was all an indigenous 
rights advocate could ask (Drury 1980).  In preceding months other things had 
happened, too. 
 
1979 was a very big year in NWT history.  Commissioner Hodgson, a man now too 
large and too unashamedly pro-development for the quiet transition to democratic 
rule, was replaced by his more discreet deputy.  Indigenous leaders now decided that 
the time had come to take control of events though the legislature and several ran for 
election.  There was much speculation about what Drury and Ottawa might be 
proposing.  Then a Yellowknife newspaper printed parts of a report by this author 
(Jull 1979) provocative to the NWT white establishment but merely reflecting the 
reality that Dene, Inuit, and Métis were the overwhelming majority of permanent 
NWT residents and that the political institutions and political economy must reflect 
and address their needs first and foremost. 
 
An unhelpful event nearby created indigenous uncertainty.  The longtime Yukon MP, 
and now a minister in the short-lived Clark Conservative government in Ottawa, 
propelled his prime minister into prematurely transferring power to the extremely 
indigenous-unfriendly Yukon Territory government.  Yukon Indians (including 
Métis) had been negotiating land claims quietly for years and the Commissioner there 
was seen as a balancing force to help make sure the Indians were not steam-rollered 
by aggressive pro-development whites.  The transfer set off alarm bells across all 
indigenous Canada, especially the NWT, as people wondered what policies the Clark 
government might reveal next.  In fact Clark backtracked quickly and meetings were 
held to reassure Indians and re-start negotiations.  However, this brief episode, albeit 
typical of new and inexperienced governments everywhere, was one of several faux 
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pas by the Clark government in 1979 leading to its defeat in Parliament and defeat in 
the elections following in early 1980.  It created a very negative image of Clark in 
indigenous eyes, sad because the man was (and presumably is, being national Tory 
leader again today) genuinely sensitive and committed on indigenous issues. 
 
Meanwhile, the great 1979 breakthrough after the change of NWT Commissioner was 
the territorial election.  Older redneck whites were replaced by younger better 
educated whites with no racial anxieties, persons happy to accept indigenous rights 
and to work with indigenous people.  Also elected were a number of well known 
indigenous leaders – Métis, Dene, and Inuit.  Most extraordinary was the newly 
elected members’ first act.  They convened quickly in a short special session to 
repudiate the constitutional and indigenous rights positions of their predecessors and 
they established a ‘unity committee’ to report on the future of the NWT.  The main 
finding of the report delivered in 1980 was that territorial unity and the existing NWT 
government were neither natural nor acceptable to indigenous peoples, and that the 
existing NWT structures were seen as merely an ‘interim arrangement’ (MacQuarrie 
1980; Jull 1992).  As in the Drury report, ‘Banquo’s ghost’ who insisted on disrupting 
the party was Nunavut.  The NWT future hinged on the future of Nunavut and what 
Inuit would do.  As subsequent events would show, Inuit commitment was clear and 
persistent. 
 
The question for the future NWT constitution now was not if change but how and 
when to achieve it.  Inuit were determined to have Nunavut, and even the Drury report 
which had botched the question was unable to reject it entirely.  In April 1982 an 
NWT-wide referendum was held on whether or not to create Nunavut.  Ottawa 
panicked and said it would not respect the outcome.16  In the 1982 referendum many 
in Denendeh did not bother to vote.  In Nunavut, however, not only did Inuit vote in 
record numbers, but they voted 4-1 for Nunavut.  This was too clear a signal even for 
a timid Ottawa.  Creation of Nunavut became both NWT and federal government 
policy.  Luckily the Inuit also had a reasonable majority in the NWT-wide vote so 
they had ‘won’ the referendum in every sense. 
 
Denendeh was where the bigger problems were.  Not only were the several Dene 
nations – e.g., Dogrib, Deh Cho (a.k.a. Slavey), Gwichin, Sahtu, Chipewyan – of 
differing views, but the Inuvialuit (Inuit of the Western Arctic) and white towns had 
decidedly different agendas.  Since the 1982 vote, just as in the years before, the Dene 
would try to lead or at least manage successive constitutional development exercises 
in Denendeh, but they were unable to win sufficient support from others to carry 
arguments to conclusion.  They also had their preliminary land claims agreement fall 
apart amid recriminations.  But the whites overplayed their hand.  Having resisted 
many Dene proposals for years, they found themselves now faced with Inuvialuit and 
Dene regions, each with its own land claims settlement and regional government 
structure agreed or under negotiation.  This would decentralise NWT governance to 
such an extent that some doubt the NWT government would have a serious role.  The 
                                                           
16 This is a good example of Ottawa’s long-time fearfulness of anything which could be seen 
as accepting principles of separatism and, therefore, feeding Quebec nationalism – whether 
support for indigenous rights at the UN or overdue changes at home.  The mere name of the 
Dene Nation, when adopted in 1975, set off a frenzy in Ottawa, with one nervous minister 
publishing an attack poster in reply.  The fact that King George III had no trouble with the 
word ‘nation’ for indigenous peoples 200 years earlier was apparently forgotten. 
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NWT might become a sort of confederation.  Meanwhile, today it is enjoying its 6th or 
7th indigenous Premier. 
 
The NWT narrative will move to Nunavut, below.  However, the NWT story is 
common to many countries in its basic dynamics.  A national government 
ambivalently or alternately favouring environmental and indigenous values on the one 
hand, and national development and resource extraction projects on the other, is faced 
with noisy classical liberalism from settlers who wish to control hinterland politics 
through their command of, or familiarity with, the national political system.  
Indigenous rights and imperatives are initially dismissed as backward or racist.  
However, the truculence of settler bodies and leaders repels national authorities and 
national opinion, while the skill or pathos of indigenous peoples attracts growing 
sympathy.  Solutions lie in changing conventional systems or adding new elements to 
them, e.g., Sami parliaments or national indigenous rights guarantees in law. 
 
 
2. Opening the Constitution 
 
The Constitution has been central to Canada’s political debates since the mid-1960s 
(Russell 1993; Robertson 2000).  In some ways this assisted indigenous peoples by 
opening up the fundamental law for reform and in increasing public awareness of 
federal principles.  That is, Canada has two distinct levels of government, federal and 
provincial, each with its own sovereign power and each protected by the Constitution 
and the Supreme Court of Canada from interference by the other level.  Ottawa cannot 
simply intervene in matters for which provinces have jurisdiction (e.g., lands and 
resources), and provinces cannot interfere in federal matters (e.g., criminal law, Indian 
and Inuit rights).  Persons unfamiliar with federal states find this structure difficult to 
understand.  It is also difficult for Canadians and their governments because 
disentangling jurisdiction in, e.g., water, can be virtually impossible.17  Ottawa cannot 
override provincial governments at will.  However, some important matters have not 
been tested.  It is believed that Ottawa could not make land claims settlements without 
provincial cooperation as these involve matters that are either under provincial 
jurisdiction or relate closely to provincial responsibilities, e.g., forestry management. 
 
Federalism complicates many issues.  Canadian anxiety since the early 1960s about 
‘Quebec separatism’, i.e., the possibility that Quebec would secede and break up 
Canada, has made governments and public fearful about indigenous claims and 
agendas as another fragmenting force (Russell & Ryder 1997).  A further threat has 
been ‘Western alienation’ – i.e., resentment in Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, and 
British Columbia, the provinces with the highest proportions of indigenous people,18 
against Ottawa, some national policies, and the political dominance of the great 
central provinces of Ontario and Quebec.  Western provincial politics have been 
polarised between the NDP (New Democratic Party, the ‘labour’ party) and various 
Right parties.  However, it is not always easy to make generalisations about party 
politics in Canada.  The Conservatives (‘Tories’) nationally have strong ‘Red Tory’ 
elements with progressive social outlooks overlapping with NDP and Liberal views at 
                                                           
17 The author represented his federal government office on the inter-departmental committee 
which oversaw drafting of the Canada Water Act. 
18 However, much higher proportions of indigenous peoples are found in the Territories – 
Nunavut, NWT, and the Yukon in descending order. 
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national level (Nevitte & Gibbins 1990, 37); Saskatchewan voters may elect the NDP 
provincially but Conservative or even more conservative members to federal 
Parliament in Ottawa; and Quebec has often elected gradualist separatist Parti 
Québecois governments provincially but sent staunch federalist Liberals to Ottawa.  
In Canada the provincial Premiers are usually the real ‘opposition’ to the federal 
government.  Provincial agendas vis-à-vis Ottawa have much continuity despite 
changes of provincial governing party.  Because Canadian parties are not ‘vertically 
integrated’, e.g., provincial Liberals in British Columbia have indigenous policies 
very different from the national Liberal government, political provincialism is 
deepened.  Recently the Reform party, now recreated as the Canadian Alliance, has 
been a more visible and audible Opposition in Ottawa because of its populist Right 
positions on social and cultural (including indigenous) issues. 
 
Indian nations had long realised that constitutional recognition and constitutional 
change were both necessary for their security.  They rejected the official Ottawa view 
that the federal Indian Act ‘gave’ them what rights they had.  They believed that their 
rights existed prior to the White Man’s settlement and governance in North America, 
and that governments today should recognise them.  However, Ottawa’s full power in 
indigenous affairs in the 1867 Constitution was the essential protection for Indians 
and Inuit from provincial governments, i.e., protection from provincial land and 
resource powers.  (Australia embodies the grim results of sub-national governments 
combining land powers and control of indigenous matters, i.e, a history of racial 
violence and black marginalisation creating a contemporary socio-economic 
morass.)19  Inuit, Dene, and other northern peoples have also been anxious that their 
rights and future be secured against provinces seeking to extend their boundaries 
northwards as happened earlier in the 20th century.  After indigenous people achieved 
northern territorial government reform (see NWT section above), they and northern 
whites were anxious to have guarantees that those territorial governments and 
territories not be diminished. 
 
Yukon and NWT indigenous peoples, like those in Northern Quebec, had been 
negotiating de facto constitutional change through land claims agreements or treaties.  
It was not called ‘constitutional’, but it was that all the same.  New governments and 
political institutions were being created, and the powers and roles of existing 
territorial governments were changing.  (BC’s new Nisga’a treaty [NiTC 2000] has 
been challenged in court because it is said to represent constitutional change and 
therefore requires special scrutiny under BC law.  Strictly speaking it is like the 
northern claims settlements, i.e., possible in principle under Canada’s constitution 
from 1763.  Whether these treaties are constitutional changes per se, in practice they 
are something new.20) 
 
                                                           
19 The best introduction may be the social histories of Queensland Aboriginal policy by 
Rosalind Kidd, frontier histories of Henry Reynolds, and the essay-style historical survey by 
David Day. 
20 On March 10, 2001, another major BC agreement-in-principle or treaty-in-principle was 
signed with the Nuu-chah-nulth, the people Captain Cook called Nootka, whose territory is the 
western half of Vancouver Island.  One of their reserves near Port Alberni hosted the founding 
conference of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples in autumn 1975.  They are negotiating 
an agreement involving, inter alia, the Pacific Rim National Park, environmentally and 
culturally iconic islands of primeval forest, fisheries, the forest industry, self-government, etc.  
See NuTC 2001. 
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After failed attempts to agree on national Constitutional changes, Prime Minister 
Trudeau invited Indians, Inuit, and Métis to join Ottawa and the provinces in yet 
another attempt in mid-197821 (Jull 1981).  If recognition of various rights could be 
negotiated, the result could be enshrined in a new Constitution.  In February 1979 this 
was broadened by Trudeau and Ontario Tory premier Davis who set the pace for the 
other premiers in a small in camera meeting (which had broken off from a televised 
heads of government conference) to a broader invitation to indigenous leaders to meet 
with government leaders face to face to discuss constitutional issues.  ‘Red Tory’ Joe 
Clark continued this initiative after he defeated Trudeau’s government in May 1979.  
In September 1979 Clark met with Canada’s national and regional Indian leaders and 
promised that face-to-face federal-provincial-indigenous meetings would be a forum 
for discussion of many items, not simply one new item squeezed into Canada’s 
already long list of constitutional issues.  In December 1979 a committee of federal 
and provincial constitutional ministers met with indigenous leaders in a preliminary 
discussion, one in which Inuit leader Charlie Watt enumerated subjects of likely 
interest.  The federal minister warned that there would be many practical problems in 
future meetings because indigenous and government people had very different ideas 
and experience of law and of Canadian history, and different concepts of 
constitutional matters, but that if everyone tried to be patient and tolerant successful 
outcomes could be achieved (Jull 1981).  This would prove prophetic.  But also in 
December the Clark minority government’s Budget was defeated in Parliament and 
elections were called.  Trudeau was persuaded not to leave politics and he returned as 
Prime Minister early in 1980. 
 
It must be remembered of these constitutional developments – and those in the NWT 
and Nunavut – that they were occurring against a background of major constitutional 
dispute between Ottawa and Quebec about the future of Canada.  There was also 
dispute between Ottawa and Western provinces wanting more power and recognition 
for their growing population and dynamic society, and between Ottawa and all 
provinces on several niggling issues.  Trudeau, meanwhile, was determined to 
entrench a constitutional Charter of Rights, including French language rights, and to 
secure a constitutional amending formula so that Canada did not have to ask the 
British Parliament to rubber-stamp constitutional changes, while some Premiers and 
public opinion opposed such changes.  Trudeau wanted a package of ‘patriation’ 
reforms.  Not repatriation, because the Constitution had always been a British law 
and now it would come to Canada for the first time (although its details had been 
worked out in the 1860s by Canada’s legendary founding Prime Minister, Sir John A 
Macdonald, and other Canadian politicians).  Any changes, however, would have to 
pass through the British parliament for one last time.  In the 1979-81 period, not only 
                                                           
21 Not the least reason for the opening was the federal hope that provinces would do their part 
in future indigenous policy.  They had refused to meet with Ottawa or discuss major inter-
governmental issues for fear of high costs or a move to dump federal constitutional 
obligations on them.  This meant in practice that they were (and are) running the risk of urban 
racial explosions like those Canadians witnessed in the USA in the 1960s.  Indians have been 
so wary of any federal moves to dump them on the provinces that they helped maintain 
federal timidity.  Any Ottawa fantasies of dodging or shifting responsibilities to provinces died 
with the 1968 white paper.  So the national constitutional process from the early 1980s 
brought indigenous and provincial sides together in a climate which, at its best, has allowed 
for easier solutions of many practical problems of public services delivery, capital works, etc.  
The late 1980s saw the first published studies of inter-governmental and constitutional politics 
appearing, notably such fine books as Long et al. 1989; Hawkes 1989; and Dacks 1990. 
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were Quebec politicians lobbying in London against Trudeau’s proposals which they 
feared would inhibit their future exercise of power, but Indian and some Métis leaders 
were a frequent presence in London attracting publicity to their socio-economic and 
constitutional needs and demands at home.  Inuit took out a half-page ad in The Times 
in December 1980, putting their case to the British Parliament, carefully written to 
pressure but not enrage Trudeau or his justice minister, Jean Chrétien.  (Within 48 
hours a senior federal minister came to the Inuit to discuss possible constitutional 
agreements.) 
 
When Trudeau returned to power in early 1980, provinces which had opposed him in 
early 1979 were now facing a new situation.  He withdrew his conciliatory 1979 
offers to them.  But first there was a Quebec referendum on independence or 
‘sovereignty-association’ in June 1980.  Successive Quebec premiers have blurred the 
question in these referenda so that they can claim to be separatist and not separatist at 
the same time, thereby appealing to more voters – a practice which has now led Prime 
Minister Chrétien to legislate a Clarity Act to force a clear referendum choice.  
Trudeau made several speeches in 1980 before this first referendum, and even 
referred positively to the ‘Inuit nation’, despite the fact that Inuit themselves do not 
use this term.  In late April he made a major pre-referendum speech to Canada’s 
indigenous leaders.  In particular he wanted Quebec’s indigenous peoples to vote in 
large numbers, despite the fact that they would normally be busy ‘out on the land’, 
i.e., away from their villages, with the spring goose hunt.  Inuit and many Indians in 
Quebec are strongly pro-federal and oppose Quebec independence, so their votes 
could be important.  In this speech Trudeau changed the constitutional outlook for 
indigenous peoples by explicitly accepting their preferred agenda topics rather than 
the usual White Man’s categories.  Ottawa would support constitutional discussion 
between governments and indigenous peoples on indigenous self-government within 
Canada, ‘aboriginal rights’ (the first time that term had been used at a high level by 
the Canadian government), treaty rights, indigenous political representation (e.g., in 
Parliament), and the actual needs and delivery of government programs by all levels 
of government to indigenous peoples.  Trudeau and Clark had earlier agreed to 
provide constitutional funding to enable indigenous peoples to hold consultations, hire 
experts, and prepare their case. 
 
In mid-1980 Trudeau pressed the provinces to work on the patriation package, a long 
hot constitutional summer, leaving aside indigenous peoples who were supposedly not 
affected.  However, indigenous peoples feared that any changes which strengthened 
the provinces or changed the rules for constitutional amendment would pre-empt their 
hopes for rights recognition.  They lobbied in London to publicise their case.  A 
special parliamentary constitutional committee was set up in Ottawa to consider 
elements of the patriation package.  The Tories insisted that its proceedings be 
televised.  To the amazement of many, Canadians took a strong interest in this 
unlikely ‘TV show’ and especially in the discussion of rights.  Because they watched 
American TV police dramas, Canadians blandly assumed that they had the same 
enumerated rights as Americans.  They did not.  As this was revealed, a strong public 
sentiment for constitutional rights grew – despite some traditionalist premiers and 
élites arguing that elected legislatures, not appointed judges interpreting constitutional 
law, should determine rights as the need arose.  The reply was that entrenched rights 
are needed precisely to protect people who may be unfashionable and unable to win 
legislative support.  Indigenous groups performed impressively, although some 
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hardline leaders lost their cause support.  The best of all, the group who made Canada 
sit up and take notice, were the Japanese-Canadians.  In World War II they had been 
persecuted and then forced into prison camps in the Rocky Mountains, their property 
and business assets confiscated.  Canadians were shocked that such things ‘could 
happen in our country!’  (At this moment of revising, September 2001, some 
Canadians are behaving badly vis-à-vis Moslems in the wake of the World Trade 
Centre attack and are being reminded by others like Toronto’s Jewish mayor Lastman 
that this is an ugly echo of Canada’s treatment of Japanese in the 1940s.) 
 
This was a turning point in Canadian constitutional politics.  No longer was the 
Constitution a matter for a few older males in dark suits to discuss and decide behind 
closed doors, but now it was a truly popular (‘of the people’) issue.  The public and 
various lobby groups demanded and won many changes.  For indigenous peoples the 
big day was Friday, January 30, 1981.  Justice minister Chrétien arrived at the 
parliamentary committee hearings from hospital looking like a corpse.  Before long he 
was fresh and happy because the Inuit promised him their support and there was likely 
Métis and Indian support for the patriation package in return for several clauses they 
sought.  At the time the package was in deep political trouble across Canada so the 
support of aggrieved indigenous peoples would be very significant.  The Inuit 
delegation led by Mark R. Gordon sought the recognition of ‘aboriginal rights’ (a 
Canadian term including native title rights), explicit recognition of the contents of the 
Royal Proclamation of 1763, the specific recognition of Inuit and Métis no less than 
Indians, and a constitutional commitment to hold face to face indigenous 
constitutional conferences with heads of government.  Chrétien wanted to leave out 
the last clause, such an apparently procedural detail seeming almost bizarre, but Inuit 
insisted.  At day’s end the national TV news showed Chrétien sitting with the three 
national indigenous leaders whom he graciously called ‘my advisers’, announcing the 
most positive changes in Canadian indigenous policy since the War of 1812. 
 
In following days and months some indigenous leaders complained that the January 
30 amendments were too little, while others said that any amendments were bad and 
might diminish indigenous rights by their implicit recognition of Canadian 
governments and sovereignty.  They campaigned against the amendments.  This gave 
provincial and federal governments the excuse which some wanted:  in November 
1981 they met to finalise the ‘patriation package’ and threw out the indigenous 
amendments.  Suddenly some of the most vocal indigenous opponents of the January 
amendments were now shouting on air about betrayal.  The following three weeks 
were extraordinary (Jull 1982).  Many indigenous leaders gathered in Ottawa and 
others in provincial capitals.  They held press conferences, had demonstrations in the 
streets, lobbied anyone and everyone they could find in governments, held strategy 
meetings, and travelled from coast to coast whipping up support.  Except for the one 
day following the federal Budget, they kept the issue of their betrayal as a main item 
on front pages of the press and TV news.  Indigenous leaders had little money and no 
high-powered professional support but they had a just cause.  Canadians responded to 
their claim that the White Man had betrayed them yet again.  A new Premier, Howard 
Pawley, elected in Manitoba, announced that his government would support the 
indigenous clauses.  Then the other governments fell into line, and with the addition 
of the word ‘existing’ to qualify ‘aboriginal rights’ (and to save face for the hardline 
Alberta premier), the indigenous clauses were restored.  When the Supreme Court of 
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Canada at last interpreted this Section 35 of the new Constitution in Sparrow, 1990, 
the word ‘existing’ was really no obstacle at all. 
 
The Constitution Act 1982 includes Part I, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 
and then Part II, Rights of the Aboriginal Peoples of Canada.  Part II says, inter alia: 
 
35. (1) The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of 
Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed. 
 
Then the Métis were included, and Inuit22 were specified in 35 (2): 
 
In this Act, "aboriginal peoples of Canada" includes the Indian, Inuit and 
Métis peoples of Canada. 
 
It then specifies in 35 (3) inter alia that ‘“treaty rights” includes rights that now exist 
by way of land claims agreements or may be so acquired’, an important protection for 
indigenous claims agreements yet to be negotiated.  Part IV, Constitutional 
Conferences, consists of Section 37 specifying indigenous-government constitutional 
conferences. 
 
One longer-term consequence of these 1981/82 amendments took Canadians by 
surprise in the Powley judgment of February 2001, twenty years after Inuk leader 
Mark R. Gordon fought in that January committee room to have Métis included in the 
definition of ‘aboriginal peoples’. 
 
 
Courts and ‘the Honour of the Crown’ 
 
In early 2001 in Powley, a moose hunting case, the Ontario Court of Appeal found 
that Métis near Sault Sainte Marie had rights as a people, Sharpe J writing that 
 
‘I fail to see how a bald promise that has not been acted on can justify limiting a 
constitutional right.  As I have already noted, efforts to negotiate an agreement have 
been sporadic at best.  I do not accept that uncertainty about identifying those entitled 
to assert Métis rights can be accepted as a justification for denying the right.  The 
appellant [the Ontario government] has led no evidence to show that it has made a 
serious effort to deal with the question of Métis rights.  The basic position of the 
government seems to have been simply to deny that these rights exist, absent a 
decision from the courts to the contrary.  While I do not doubt that there has been 
considerable uncertainty about the nature and scope of Métis rights, this is hardly a 
reason to deny their existence.  There is an element of uncertainty about most broadly 
worded constitutional rights.  The government cannot simply sit on its hands and then 
defend its inaction because the nature of the right or the identity of the bearers of the 
right is uncertain.  The appellant failed to satisfy the trial judge, the Superior Court 
judge on appeal, and has failed to satisfy me that it has made any serious effort to 
come to grips with the question of Métis hunting rights.’  (para. 166) 
                                                           
22 Since a Supreme Court of Canada reference in 1939 the Inuit had been deemed a full 
federal responsibility as ‘Indians’ within the meaning of the British North America Act, 1867 
(now renamed Constitution Act, 1867).  They do not fall under the Indian Act, however. 
– Jull: ‘Nations with whom We are connected’, 3rd ed. – Page 21 – 
 
And so in an instant, after so many decades of suffering, loss, and denial by those in 
authority, a whole people living from Atlantic to Pacific and nearly to the Arctic 
Ocean are recognised and validated.  One may hope that governments rise to the 
occasion and opportunity presented by this judgment to address some of the worst and 
most widespread social disadvantage and injustice in Canada – that of mixed-blood 
people, or people legally designated as mixed-blood. 
 
Throughout the land claims era it had been assumed in government that the Atlantic 
provinces were not subject to any legal ‘unfinished business’.  So on September 17, 
1999 there was considerable shock when the Supreme Court of Canada found in 
Marshall that a British treaty of 1760 in respect of indigenous fishing must be 
honoured.  Writing for the majority Binnie J said, inter alia, 
 
This appeal should be allowed because nothing less would uphold the honour and 
integrity of the Crown in its dealings with the Mi'kmaq people to secure their peace 
and friendship, as best the content of those treaty promises can now be ascertained.  
If the law is prepared to supply the deficiencies of written contracts prepared by 
sophisticated parties and their legal advisors in order to produce a sensible result 
that accords with the intent of both parties, though unexpressed, the law cannot ask 
less of the honour and dignity of the Crown in its dealings with First Nations.  An 
interpretation of events that turns a positive Mi'kmaq trade demand into a negative 
Mi'kmaq covenant is not consistent with the honour and integrity of the Crown. 
 
Marshall built on the principles in Sioui 1990 when an urgent ad hoc treaty in its 
purest military sense between the commander who had succeeded General Wolfe at 
the latter’s death on the battlefield of the Plains of Abraham with Indians nearby.  The 
Supreme Court of Canada recognised this treaty: 
 
The 1760 document is a treaty within the meaning of s. 88 of the Indian Act. Though 
the wording of the document does not suffice to determine its legal nature, the 
historical context and evidence relating to facts which occurred shortly before or 
after the signing of the document indicate that General Murray and the Hurons 
entered into an agreement to make peace and guarantee it. They entered into this 
agreement with the intention to create mutually binding obligations that would be 
solemnly respected. All the parties involved were competent to enter into this treaty. 
Even if Great Britain was not sovereign in Canada in 1760, the Hurons could 
reasonably have believed that it had the power to enter into a treaty with them and 
that this treaty would be in effect as long as the British controlled Canada. The 
circumstances prevailing at the time indicate that Murray had the necessary capacity 
to enter into a treaty, or at least that the Hurons could reasonably have assumed he 
did in view of the importance of his position in Canada at the time. In the case of the 
Hurons, though they could not claim historical occupation or possession of the lands 
in question, this did not prevent them from concluding a treaty with the British 
Crown. A territorial claim is not essential to the existence of a treaty within the 
meaning of s. 88 of the Indian Act. 
 
The first of the great modern cases, landing with a thud when a constitutional law 
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professor, Pierre Trudeau, was Prime Minister, was the Nishga23 case, now better 
known as Calder, 1973.  The dissenting judgment24 of Hall J has become a classic 
document, e.g., 
 
This appeal raises issues of vital importance to the Indians of northern British 
Columbia and, in particular, to those of the Nishga tribe.  The Nishga tribe has 
persevered for almost a century in asserting an interest in the lands which their 
ancestors occupied since time immemorial.  The Nishgas were never conquered nor 
did they at any time enter into a treaty or deed of surrender as many other Indian 
tribes did throughout Canada and in southern British Columbia. The Crown has 
never granted the lands in issue in this action other than a few small parcels later 
referred to prior to the commencement of the action.  ...  The assessment and 
interpretation of the historical documents and enactments tendered in evidence must 
be approached in the light of present-day research and knowledge disregarding 
ancient concepts formulated when understanding of the customs and culture of our 
original people was rudimentary and incomplete and when they were thought to be 
wholly without cohesion, laws or culture, in effect a subhuman species.  [After 
lamenting US Chief Justice Marshall’s 1823 wording about ‘fierce savages, whose 
occupation was war’, Hall continues that] We now know that that assessment was ill-
founded. The Indians did in fact at times engage in some tribal wars but war was not 
their vocation and it can be said that their preoccupation with war pales into 
insignificance when compared to the religious and dynastic wars of "civilized" 
Europe of the 16th and 17th centuries. 
 
The Hall judgment reads in part that: 
 
The [British Columbia] Court of Appeal erred in accepting the proposition that, after 
a conquest or discovery, the appellants' predecessors had no rights at all except those 
subsequently granted or recognized by the conqueror or discoverer.  There is an 
aboriginal Indian interest usufructuary in nature which is a burden on the title of the 
Crown and is inalienable except to the Crown and extinguishable only by a legislative 
enactment of the Parliament of Canada. This aboriginal title does not depend on 
treaty, executive order or legislative enactment but flows from the fact that the owners 
of the interest have from time immemorial occupied the areas in question and have 
established a pre-existing right of possession. In the absence of an indication that the 
sovereign intends to extinguish that right the aboriginal title continues. 
 
Furthermore, the Proclamation of 1763, since it applies to ‘all the Lands and 
Territories lying to the Westward of the Sources of the Rivers which fall into the Sea 
from the West and North West as aforesaid’ indicated that the framers of the 
Proclamation were well aware that there was territory to the west of the sources of 
the rivers and showed that it was intended to include therein the lands west of the 
Rocky Mountains.  In addition, the recorded activities of the explorers at the time do 
not support the view that the territory west of the Rockies was terra incognita. 
 
Once aboriginal title is established it is presumed to continue until the contrary is 
                                                           
23 The spelling Nisga’a has only come into general use since then. 
24 Seven of the nine Supreme Court of Canada judges heard the case, with 6 agreeing that 
‘aboriginal rights’ existed in principle (i.e., something briskly denied by all levels of 
government in Canada until then), but splitting 3-3 on whether title survived in BC. 
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proven and when the predecessors of the appellants came under British sovereignty 
they were entitled to assert their Indian title as a legal right.  This right could not 
therefore be extinguished except by surrender to the Crown or by competent 
legislative authority and then only by specific legislation.  However, there was no 
surrender by the Nishgas and neither the Colony of British Columbia nor the 
Province, after Confederation, nor the Parliament of Canada, enacted legislation 
specifically purporting to extinguish the Indian title. It must be presumed that the 
British Crown intended to respect native rights and the onus of proving that the 
Sovereign intended to extinguish the Indian title was on the respondent.  The 
Proclamations and Ordinances relied on to establish an exercise of sovereignty and 
the assertion of title to lands by the Crown in fee were not relevant to the claim 
brought by the appellants which did not challenge the fee of the Crown but rather 
sought a declaration that the appellants possessed a right of occupation against the 
world except the Crown and that the Crown had not to date lawfully extinguished that 
right. In any event, the Proclamations and Ordinances relied on, to the extent that 
they extinguished aboriginal Indian title, were ultra vires since the Commission, 
Letters Patent and Instructions forming an integral part of the Commission, of the 
colonial Governor did not give any power or authorization to extinguish Indian title. 
 
These and other leading court cases and other useful documents are now available on-
line from the Courts who issued them and from various indigenous law sites.25  The 
language, concepts, and principles of these tremendous cases have seemed almost 
Biblical as Canadians and their governments have attempted to re-think and re-
negotiate the fundamental terms of human settlement and peaceful inter-cultural 
relations in North America.  That so much is being achieved so painlessly, hysterical 
talkback radio hosts notwithstanding, is the remarkable fact. 
 
Because Canada’s indigenous political renaissance owed little, initially, to formal 
political philosophies or the social sciences as has occurred in Northern Europe and 
Australia, and because it occurred in the era of welfare state paternalism when 
indigenous people mostly dealt with rule-bound and rule-minded junior personnel in 
local offices for their official contacts, it lacked an appropriate or recognisable 
rhetoric.26  Traumatised by the reaction to the 1969 white paper, the federal 
government for its part said as little as possible as elliptically as possible, fearing a 
repeat of Indian rage.  And so some few phrases leaped out – ‘Canada’s two founding 
peoples’ (i.e., French and British!), ‘the Dene Nation’, and at the first televised 
indigenous-government conference Nisga’a chief Gosnell’s view of his people’s 
rights ‘lock, stock, and barrel’ to their territories.  The first was absurd, for which 
reason it helped the general public embrace Indians and Inuit as actual and obvious 
founding peoples; the second and third generated public confusion and anxiety.  Thus, 
the White Man’s high court responses became the dominant verbal, moral, and 
philosophical stream in Canada’s English-language culture with respect to indigenous 
peoples, while indigenous leaders became nationally known in the White Man’s 
                                                           
25 E.g., for cases in the period 1763-1973, see: http://library.usask.ca/native/cnlc/index.html 
For later Supreme Court of Canada cases, e.g., the 1990 Sioui and Sparrow, see: 
http://www.lexum.umontreal.ca/csc-scc/en/pub/1990/vol1/index.html 
26 And so indigenous political and policy debate across the ethno-cultural divide is full of the 
small change of official jargon such as ‘meaningful consultation’, ‘ongoing process’, 
‘consultative mechanisms’, etc., although such lugubrious bureau-speak may be better than 
sharp clear words bringing sharp clear divisions. 
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culture no less than in their own with their plain, clear, and often eloquent English.  
The two sides of this verbal continuum were worthy equals.27  Canadians generally 
knew nothing of the debates within indigenous communities or in indigenous 
languages.  Moses and the Promised Land were an image much used among Inuit 




In June 1982 indigenous teams met Prime Minister Trudeau in three separate 
meetings – Inuit, Indian, and Métis – to discuss the process for holding the 
indigenous-government conferences now required by the Constitution.  This process 
would turn into a multi-year series of televised First Ministers Conferences (FMCs) 
held in March or April in 1983, 1984, 1985, and 1987 (NFB 1987; Kajlich 2000).  
FMCs and executive federalism had long been the central feature of Canada’s 
political and policy culture.  They have many uses in finding political consensus 
among players long familiar with each other and with the issues they discuss.  They 
are élite rituals full of coded terms and protocols.  They were, therefore, highly 
improbable forums for indigenous persons to bring their anger, grievances, hopes, and 
demands in search of clear answers.  Things are rarely clear in First Ministers 
Conferences.  On the other hand, no other forum or process could signal so loudly the 
national importance of indigenous peoples and their concerns. 
 
A First Ministers Conference is a high peak in a mountain range.  It is preceded and 
followed by ministers’ meetings and high officials’ meetings, and much work goes on 
for a long period in preparation for all of these.  A breakthrough was the first serious 
meeting of indigenous delegations with federal and provincial officials (i.e., public 
servants, not politicians) in late 1982.  Indigenous issues had previously been seen as 
a low order rural welfare matter carried out by low order government bureaux, but 
now the best and brightest of federal, provincial, and territorial governments were 
assembled and ready to be involved.  What these persons might lack in background 
knowledge or experience of indigenous issues they would make up in liberal outlooks 
and access to influence and expertise.  The Indian leaders had decided to boycott the 
meeting and had only observers present, so the young Inuit leader Mark R. Gordon 
was the principal indigenous spokesperson.  This was fortunate because he was 
articulate, incisive, amusing, and could present the most difficult issues and problems 
with ease across the cultural divide.  The provinces were unconvinced about this 
whole indigenous constitutional initiative, and about the possibilities of reasonable 
dealings with indigenous leaders at all, but by the end of the first of the meeting’s two 
days Gordon had won them around on both counts. 
 
Inuit sent a simple powerful message at the televised FMCs.  At some point an Inuk 
speaker or a TV crew would point to the booths for simultaneous interpreting in the 
chamber – English, French, and Inuktitut.  Across the northern third of Canada the 
language of daily use was neither English nor French, something few Canadians 
really understood. 
 
                                                           
27 I am grateful to Justice Binnie’s Marshall and Justice Sharpe’s Powley judgments for 
reminding me of this power of language, and to Professors Northrop Frye and James 
Carscallen at Victoria College, University of Toronto, for making me conscious of ‘great 
codes’ and of prophecy as social vision, back in the 1960s. 
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The conference years were astounding with their high drama and low farce.  The 
process was kept alive through the years by ‘political accords’ which papered over 
stalemates and disagreement, providing opposed sides with more time to work 
through difficult issues and to keep talking to each other (Kajlich 2000).  A fine 
video, Dancing Around the Table, shows the interplay of indigenous grass roots 
reality and high conference rhetoric (NFB 1987).  The quality of governmental 
political leadership, vision, and expertise was significantly greater at the beginning 
than at the end.  The disappointment of the indigenous delegations was powerfully 
and passionately expressed in the final session of the last conference by Saskatchewan 
Métis leader Jim Sinclair.  While Prime Minister Mulroney and the Premiers said they 
could not sign up to indigenous self-government because it was too vague, the same 
men had no trouble signing up to truly vague constitutional recognition of Quebec’s 
unique status some weeks later at Meech Lake.  (When the deadline for the Meech 
agreement to become law was reached in 1990, a single Indian member of the 
Manitoba legislature used a procedural veto to kill the whole package.)  The 
indigenous disappointment of 1987 was left by governments to fester for several years 
until indigenous anger erupted in mid-1990 at a small Mohawk reserve, Oka, at the 
mouth of the Ottawa River over a 290-year-old land rights grievance.  The 
deployment of the Canadian army and its tanks against a small community of Indians 
in response did very little for Canada’s image in the world, sharing TV news images 
with Saddam Hussein’s tanks in Kuwait.  Fortunately some of the Indians and some 
military personnel present saved Quebec and Ottawa political leaderships, saved 
themselves, and saved the country from bloody disaster.  Oka triggered sympathy 
actions among indigenous people across Canada and was truly the end of Mulroney’s 
quiet time in indigenous policy. 
 
The ‘failure’ of these 1980s conferences was an opportunity missed but not a dead 
end (Jull 1987; Kajlich 2000).  They had highlighted the fact that indigenous peoples 
– unlike great cities, unions, or business – could sit down with Prime Minister and 
Premiers to re-negotiate the Constitution itself and the wider constitution of 
arrangements small and large which make up Canada.  They had introduced non-
indigenous Canadians to a plethora of ‘new’ indigenous personalities, many of them 
charismatic and articulate, who made too familiar premiers and ministers look rather 
pedestrian.  The passion of their cause was a change from the bland circumlocutions 
of daily political talk. 
 
Soon Prime Minister Mulroney had to open the door to a more intense round of 
indigenous work as part of the broad negotiated constitutional packages embodied in 
the Charlottetown Accord, 1992.  Although that Accord was defeated in a national 
referendum, polling showed that the indigenous elements were relatively popular.  
(Mulroney also had to appoint a Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, most of 
whose Commissioners were indigenous, to appease indigenous anger.  So great was 
the distrust of Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, by this stage in his career known as 
‘Lyin’ Brian’, that he entrusted the terms of reference for RCAP to former Chief 
Justice Dickson and then published the final version plus Dickson’s proposals so that 
we would all see that he had not made mischief with such important questions.) 
 
But little may have been lost ultimately despite the 1987 and 1992 ‘failures’.  This is 
the hard fact:  the processes of negotiation were part of a longer stream, and the 
evolving consensus and evolving indigenous political culture have been positive.  The 
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period of breakdown from the March 1987 FMC to Oka in July 1990 was the only 
interval for decades in which Canadian indigenous policy and constitutional 
accommodation were not progressing.  When they resumed in 1990, they progressed 
more quickly.  Trying to avoid constitutional conferences which Quebec might turn 
into a separation scenario, Canadian Anglophone and some Francophone politicians, 
and indigenous leaders, have been content to help move constitutional consensus 
along more quietly.  Charlottetown would have made indigenous government a third 
order of government along with existing federal and provincial governments, but this 
is occurring willy-nilly.  Prime Minister Chrétien and the federal government have 
formally accepted an indigenous ‘inherent right to self-government’ since August 
1995.  Canada now has three sections of the public with very different senses of 
national identity – Anglophone, Francophone, and indigenous – but sharing a 
common civic identity (Russell 1999-2000; Kymlicka 1998; Ignatieff 2000). 
 
 
3. Building Nunavut 
 
Following the 1982 referendum supporting Nunavut (see NWT above), the NWT 
Legislative Assembly created two bodies, a Western Constitutional Forum (WCF) for 
Denendeh and a Nunavut Constitutional Forum (NCF).  They were made up of 
elected Members of that Assembly (MLAs) to reflect its cultural diversity, plus 
elected leaders of the major indigenous associations in Denendeh and Nunavut 
respectively.  Again one sees the implicit view that an elected legislature by itself, and 
even with genuine indigenous leaders now among its members, did not sufficiently 
represent indigenous aspirations or society.  (This view was made explicit in a talk to 
the two Forums together in February 1985 by federal DIAND minister Crombie, a 
former teacher of constitutional politics, see Jull 1985.) 
 
From the start the WCF apparently hoped to hold back rampaging Nunavut while 
harnessing its momentum for their own more difficult process.  They viewed NCF as 
having committed itself to move in tandem.  The NCF, however, had no such view 
and simply wanted to create Nunavut as soon as possible, having seen the 1982 
referendum as a needless delay.  NCF insouciance and WCF suspicion proved 
corrosive.  Things began well.  In late 1982 the leading NWT members and 
indigenous leaders visited Ottawa and lobbied cabinet ministers and others for 
constitutional progress, especially on issues of resource revenues and block funding.  
Ottawa was astounded.  The northern whites and natives had been at each other’s 
throats for years and here they were now, all friendly and mutually supportive.  
Nobody was in any doubt that this was a new era in the North. 
 
Before the 1979 election the NWT had been one huge federal electoral riding.  Now it 
was split so that the Inuit area including the Western Arctic could elect its own 
member.  Peter Ittinuar, an able and intelligent Inuk from Rankin Inlet, won the seat 
as an NDP candidate.28  He was articulate and backed by good staff work and 
research, so his initiatives were effective.  His office became an Inuit outpost in 
Ottawa.  It would be hard to overstate its importance.  During the January 1981 
                                                           
28 NDP, the New Democratic Party, is Canada’s ‘labour’ party, originally a Western Canada 
popular movement in which Christian clergy played key roles.  It has never held office at 
national level, but has formed governments in recent decades in Ontario, Manitoba, 
Saskatchewan, and British Columbia. 
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Constitutional ‘negotiations’ with Chrétien and the Trudeau government, his office 
played a crucial role despite a reluctant national NDP leader.  More generally, a 
scattered people in the most remote areas of Canada suddenly had Ottawa access and 
could have problems and aspirations taken up with politicians and officials.29  
Canadians accept that particular circumstances such as a distinct culture or region, or 
huge distances, should allow the usual representation measure by population numbers 
to be varied to provide effective electoral representation.  On the other hand, when 
Brian Mulroney had half the Inuit of Quebec’s Arctic coast in his huge southern St. 
Lawrence River-based riding in the mid-1980s, he did not even bother to visit their 
region during the 1984 election campaign which made him Prime Minister.  But in 
late 1982, Peter Ittinuar used his seat in an unusual way:  he defected to Trudeau’s 
Liberals in return for federal support for Nunavut, announced at the same time as his 
switch.30  Thereafter, Ittinuar was able to play a valuable role within the governing 
party on Inuit constitutional matters, not least when sitting beside Trudeau during the 
1980s First Ministers Conferences discussed above.  (At other times Trudeau 
appointed both an NWT and a Quebec Inuk to Canada’s Senate, an un-elected job for 
life.  Both Senators Willie Adams and Charlie Watt have provided valuable access to 
the national political process for all indigenous peoples.) 
 
The NCF chose a white lawyer fluent in the Inuit language as chair.  Chairperson 
Dennis Patterson, elected in Nunavut’s main town, Iqaluit, was also NWT Minister of 
Aboriginal Rights and Constitutional Development, and Minister of Education, and 
later, ‘premier’ (Government Leader).  This was politically deft, disarming anxieties 
among Canadian public, media, and officials about Inuit racial ‘separatism’.  Inuit 
reasoned that a lawyer would be skilled in the legal and constitutional work ahead.  
Inuit leader John Amagoalik, recognised as the longtime guiding spirit of the Nunavut 
movement, was the other key NCF figure. 
 
NCF’s first year’s work was frenetic.  Forum meetings were open to the media.  At a 
meeting in Tuktoyaktuk it was agreed to welcome the Inuvialuit to NCF, a move 
which upset WCF.  The question of whether the Inuvialuit would be part of Nunavut 
or part of the Western NWT, and the precise location of the Nunavut boundary vis-à-
vis Dene, would become the most vexing (and one of two serious) problems facing 
Nunavut.  The Western NWT was determined to keep the Inuvialuit homeland of the 
Mackenzie Delta and Beaufort Sea coast, not least for their proven oil and gas 
reserves.  Some Inuvialuit leaders were playing hardball politics, more eager to push 
the Western NWT into offering them greater future autonomy within the NWT than 
wishing to be a minority region in Nunavut’s far west. 
 
The main work of NCF was to develop a constitutional plan or framework which 
would both win federal government approval and express Inuit needs and aspirations.  
Canada, its government, and public had been obsessed with ‘Quebec separatism’ for 
20 years.  Almost anything which was seen as ethnically or culturally defined, or 
which was centred on non-WASP31 Canadians, attracted irrational public fears.  For 
                                                           
29 The author distinguishes between elected politicians and hired public service officials in the 
usual Canadian way. 
30 Greenland MP Moses Olsen also played a pivotal role in Danish government acceptance of 
Greenland home rule in the early 1970s, as did Lars Emil Johansen at a later stage, and 
Alaskan Inuit are adept at the art of Congressional influence. 
31 I.e., White Anglo-Saxon Protestants. 
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instance, when Canadian Inuit became active in the Inuit Circumpolar Conference 
from early 1980, MPs and others were fretful that this Inuit internationalism was 
really a move towards a separate Arctic nation-state, despite the fact that non-
indigenous Canadians themselves were enthusiastic members of the British 
Commonwealth of Nations and the Francophonie.  Apart from occasional wishing out 
loud by idealistic youth or visionary elders, Inuit in Canada never seriously 
contemplated boundary changes.  (Also, Arctic Quebec Inuit, like Quebec’s nine First 
Nations, would prefer to remain in Canada than stay within an independent new 
Quebec.)  But so inflamed was Canadian sentiment, and so opposed to Nunavut were 
some federal officials, that some demonising of Dene and Inuit as ‘separatists’ was 
inevitable.  So Inuit knew that they had to make their position very clear, i.e., that 
they were trying to join Canada as full participants. 
 
Inuit wanted to regain maximum control of their lands and seas, wrest political and 
administrative control of their communities and daily lives from outsiders, fill as 
many jobs as possible with Inuit (and prepare Inuit to hold such jobs), and have a 
government strong and clever enough to deal effectively with powerful outside 
interests such as the oil industry and the federal government.  They were quite willing 
to be flexible on details, but these goals were fundamental.  The White Man’s 
governance had been so intrusive and disruptive since the 1950s that Inuit were 
unenthusiastic about any government, and were (and would remain) anxious that any 
new authority in their daily lives must be different and much more Inuit-friendly with 
many more Inuit decision-makers and staff.  Until the Nunavut government achieves 
that – and education and training will not catch up for some years – they will not stop 
worrying.  That being said, Nunavut has now attracted many young and not so young 
non-Inuit who are committed to Inuit goals and to acquiring Inuit language and 
culture. 
 
There were other difficult issues.  Nunavut has a very small population, only c. 27,000 
people.  In theory it would take only a few major development projects to overwhelm 
the Inuit in their homeland.  Of course, not everyone chooses Arctic living and even 
resource projects now fly staff in and out from Southern Canada for multi-week shifts.  
To deal with such threats Inuit had earlier proposed 10-year residency for voting in 
Nunavut.  This caused uproar and was quickly abandoned, although a period of 2 
years residency seemed acceptable to governments and others at the time.  Also, the 
idea of isolating development workers from Inuit communities was proposed in the 
key document, Building Nunavut (NCF 1983), but immediately drew fire from 
Canada’s national newspaper, The Globe and Mail.  NCF had drawn on active 
precedents in other small Northern jurisdictions including Norway, Iceland, the 
Faroes, Shetland – all of them European peoples.  Inuit did not want their society and 
culture swamped by outsiders, with all the woes which come with transient male 
workforces as had occurred in communities in Nunavut and elsewhere in the past with 
military bases, resource extraction crews, etc.  Inuit in Greenland and North Slope 
Alaska’s also worried about such problems, the former legislating strongly to control 
the entry of outside labour.  Nunavut thus found itself confronting the liberal political 
ideology of a modern ‘first world’ country. 
 
The Canadian government also faced the issue.  It insisted that the Inuit land/sea 
claims be negotiated separately from creation of Nunavut as a self-governing territory.  
The stated reason was that a government must be open to all, whereas claims were 
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exclusive to Inuit (and the descendants of Inuit).  Inuit leaders suspected that there 
were other reasons, especially a lack of federal government commitment to a Nunavut 
government and a means for government to play off one process against the other.  
Certainly the principles stated were often ignored and Inuit had to fight every inch of 
the way until both claims and Nunavut government legislation finally were passed and 
became law simultaneously in June 1993.  However, Inuit were interested in 
outcomes more than philosophy so they did not allow government to distract them.  
Because the negotiations went on from 1976 to 1993, with much implementation 
planning to follow until 1999 when Nunavut became the government of one-fifth of 
Canada’s total land area, Inuit had constantly to educate and persuade new ministers, 
new parliamentary committees, and new prime ministers of the value and practicality 
of their Nunavut ideal.  In every case the problem was to win over persons from a 
simplistic version of liberal democratic ideology to an understanding that the Inuit 
homeland was distinct and different. 
 
For instance, Inuit wanted collective ownership of land.  Indeed, there was almost no 
private land in all Nunavut.  It was Crown (i.e., public) land.  The lack of property 
rights or use rights for indigenous peoples – that is, the refusal of the White Man’s 
legal and political system to recognise peoples who plainly owned, occupied, and 
derived their food and livelihoods from the lands and waters of what is now Canada – 
was the underlying problem in indigenous-white relations.  In a sense the whole 
indigenous claims process has been an attempt to recover something of what 
European settlers and their governments took away. 
 
In the case of Nunavut this involved the sea as much as the land.  Government experts 
and especially the federal fisheries department were outraged at Inuit demands for 
ownership, use, management, and restrictions of the sea.  However, Inuit were a 
maritime people.  They not only lived from the sea – especially from seals, walrus, 
small whales (beluga and narwhal), and polar bears – but they used its frozen surface 
for most of the year for travel, as a platform for hunting at the ice edge or by seal 
breathing holes, and for situating their hunting camps.  Here European law and 
especially international sea law clashed with Inuit needs and practice.32  There was 
some wonderful hypocrisy.  The Canadian government took Inuit sea claims 
documents to international conferences to demand recognition of Canadian 
ownership and control of marine areas in the Arctic, but, the same documents were 
rejected at home by the same government when presented as Inuit claims.  Eventually 
this story had a happy ending.  The Canadian government agreed from 1986 to accept 
Inuit sea claims in principle, overruling its fisheries department in order to move the 
Nunavut claim forward – and other claims looming in Labrador with Inuit and British 
Columbia with Indian nations such as the Nuu-chah-nulth (NuTC 2001).  Inuit 
already strongly advocated maximum Canadian control of the oceans and wanted to 
limit ships to, e.g., annual supply vessels using these ice-filled waters with their 
constant threat of accident and oil spill.  They also wanted strong enforceable safety 
standards.  At the 1989 Inuit Circumpolar Conference assembly in Sisimiut, 
Greenland, much of the corridor talk was about the Exxon Valdez disaster, one which 
took place in non-Arctic waters with perfect weather, full daylight, and no ice. 
 
                                                           
32 A forthcoming book on indigenous sea management in Tropical Torres Strait and Northern 
Australia in comparative context by Dr Nonie Sharp, Anthropology, LaTrobe University, 
Melbourne, includes Nunavut. 
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Indigenous peoples across the NWT had general hunting rights whereas others did 
not.  Outsiders or white residents could apply for some strictly limited local hunting 
rights if game was plentiful.  So the Northern and other claims settlements did not 
establish anything new in that respect.  Indeed, almost the only aspect of Indian 
treaties which had been upheld by courts in the early post-1945 era was the right to 
hunt and fish of indigenous peoples.  Some of the greatest Canadian indigenous cases, 
e.g., Sparrow 1990, Marshall 1999, and Powley 2001, are about persistence of such 
rights thought not to exist.  However, Inuit led the successful push for a Constitutional 
amendment to state clearly that indigenous rights established in the past, present, or 
future in any treaty or land claims agreement took precedence over the rest of the 
Constitutional Charter enacted in the Constitution Act 1982 (see above).  In other 
words, non-Inuit could not go to court and unravel Inuit rights on equality grounds.  
Such an amendment would probably not have been accepted by Canadians or their 
governments in the fundamentalist equal rights era post-1945, but by the 1980s it was 
unexceptional.  That is, the explicit and implicit negotiation of indigenous rights and 
interests which went on daily in the press and in countless meetings was changing the 
political culture of Canada. 
 
Nunavut would have, therefore, a dual constitution.  Like all other parts of Canada 
there would be a legislated framework for the governance of the region, the Nunavut 
Act.  This would create a government for which all residents who were Canadian 
citizens could vote.  (During the first Arctic elections in the NWT in the mid 1960s, 
sometimes the only French- or English-speaking person in a village, i.e., linguistically 
qualified to be an election officer, was, e.g., Belgian, and therefore could not legally 
do the job.)  But alongside that Act was the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement Act 
which contained many elements previously exclusive to governments, and contained 
other elements which restricted governments.  The negotiated Inuit-federal 
government Agreement thereby enacted created a number of new bodies in which 
Inuit appointed half the members through the successor to their claims organisation, 
Nunavut Tunngavik Inc (NTI).  These bodies work with government to manage the 
lands and seas, resources and development, and to plan future use.  Because this 
constitutional framework is legislated at federal level, it is not susceptible to change 
by any future Nunavut Legislative Assembly, even if such an Assembly one day has a 
majority of non-Inuit members.  Also, the Agreement is further reinforced and 
protected by the Constitution Act 1982, its provisions having the status of 
constitutional law (Section 35) and being immune to non-Inuit ‘equal rights’ lawsuits 
(Section 25). 
 
This is a new type of constitution in Canada.  Such structures also apply to Northern 
Quebec where Inuit and Cree signed their 1975 claims settlement, the Western NWT 
(where different claims apply now or will apply to other regions when negotiated), to 
parts of Labrador under Inuit and Innu, and to the Yukon.  However, in Nunavut the 
claims area and territory are coterminous, and the whole constitutional package was 
negotiated simultaneously.  Despite the distinctions in Ottawa separating the two 
processes, they were always one to Inuit. 
 
Inuit were not merely individual citizens who exercised a right to vote in territorial or 
federal elections.  They had further rights as the indigenous people of the Nunavut 
region and exercised these through NTI.  NTI now owns on their behalf selected areas 
of Nunavut, gives them special benefits from certain other areas they selected, and 
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special rights as trustees of the lands and waters of their entire ancient homeland.  NTI 
membership is not only for Inuit living today, but all future Inuit born will become 
members automatically.  In other words, an individual rights ideology prevailed 
through the Nunavut Act and collective rights through the Nunavut Land Claims 
Agreement Act. 
 
Ottawa, for its part, had faced a difficult situation.  While determined not to recognise 
or create ethnically-defined governments (despite the continued existence and 
growing roles of Indian first nations governments on Indian lands), it had to 
acknowledge that indigenous peoples were different.  The highest Canadian court had 
recognised this in Calder 1973 and other decisions.  So Ottawa used a sort of sleight 
of hand or self-deception to reach a solution.  Inuit would have their indigenous rights 
recognised through one Act while the fiction of Canada’s non-ethnic and territorially-
defined political arrangements was upheld through another Act.  Nevertheless, today 
Ottawa is negotiating self-government at 80 different ‘tables’ with indigenous 
peoples. 
 
Such juggling of realities is not unique to Canada.  The Greenland Home Rule Act of 
the Danish Folketing insists that the Danish realm is one and indivisible, but also 
acknowledges some special rights for Greenlanders in respect of their huge island 
territory.  The Sami are able to see that their Sami Parliaments in Norway, Sweden, 
and Finland are Sami-defined political bodies but other Scandinavian citizens can see 
these as simply special corporate entities which work with the national government in 
relation to certain matters like many other national organisations.  And the Norwegian 
reindeer herders association, NRL, is also a Sami-only body, one with extensive rights 
for a regionally important industry, but there are also many other ‘industry bodies’, 
e.g., the national fishers’ organisation.  Or to take another Canadian example, one 
may argue that Quebec is only a geographic region in which the population majority 
happen to be French-descended, so that language and culture reflect that Francophone 
inheritance, while many québecois insist that their province is one of the deux nations 
(‘two nations’) which make up Canada.  Such latter persons regard Canada’s 
constitutional life as an ongoing process of negotiation between two nations, joined 
recently by indigenous nations as a third.  Indeed, some Quebec nationalists view the 
addition of indigenous nations to the Canadian constitutional mix as a ploy by 
Anglophones to undermine Quebec’s territorial integrity and fundamental nationhood 
as one of two Canadas! 
 
Canadian constitutional policy-makers including the notoriously anti-ethnocentric 
Trudeau were quite ready to accept an Inuit self-governing homeland, Nunavut, in 
fact, while continuing to deny ethnic polities in theory.  One might almost say – and 
many Canadian thinkers would – that such pragmatism and measured muddle has 
been the essence of Canadian constitutional culture from the days when the British 
Parliament included Edmund Burke and others debating political arrangements for 
Quebec and the future Canada.  In their practical way Inuit understood this aspect of 
Canadian culture and, having watched the unjustified 1975-76 uproar over a ‘Dene 
nation’, were careful not to make the same political mistake.  Similarly, they avoided 
making an explicit sovereign claim to their homeland or its resources.  They were 
astute constitutional practitioners – they secured de facto sovereignty of the total area 
of their homeland while more demanding and doctrinaire indigenous groups in 
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Canada have failed to achieve any claims or political settlement at all.  (For Nunavut 
saga see Dahl et al. 2000, esp. Hicks & White 2000, and Jull 2000a & Jull 2001b.) 
 
Another matter illustrated by Nunavut is how process is an essential and central part 
of indigenous and Canadian political life.  Canada’s process-oriented political culture 
has been noted by many experts at home and abroad (e.g., Wiltshire 1992).  This has 
enabled Canadians to put difficult issues such as Nunavut itself and recognition of 
indigenous rights generally into a process and expect a resulting agreement, 
compromise, or consensus in the fullness of time.  This approach works, by and large.  
It is also the accustomed method of deliberation among most indigenous cultures with 
their high regard for individual autonomy within the group and their reluctance to 
impose outcomes. 
 
Nunavut in itself, and Nunavut as part of the wider debates on the future of the North, 
and as part of Canada’s whole post-1960 experience of indigenous recognition and 
policy reform have proceeded as a sort of multi-lateral negotiation.  Although some of 
it has occurred around or across a table, much of it has occurred through news media 
and various public processes.  This has not been ‘managed’, and to the extent that 
governments tried to manage it, they failed.  Of course, government decision-makers 
made all sorts of firm and final decisions, and announced positions, but these had a 
habit of being quickly undone by events.  Rather, all sides, including the general 
public, were learning as they went along.  Few if any knew where they would end, 
and although certain goals have been achieved, the journey and form of the result 
have been surprises.  The indigenous leadership and organisations (but certainly not 
the whole indigenous public), governments, most politicians (until the Reform party, 
now Canadian Alliance, appeared), and the informed public and national élites 
learned a great deal and moved a very long way in their assumptions and notions of 
good relations with indigenous peoples.  Most people (except the indigenous 
disadvantaged) changed their views of Canadian society, culture, history, and the 
national community.  The country, once a byword with foreigners for claustrophobic 
earnestness, began to feel larger and enhanced.  One may lament the profusion of 
books of uneven quality, sometimes seeming as if anyone who had known an Indian 
or Inuk could publish a memoir, but the fact that there was so much demand for 
literature, films, and other insights shows the depth of commitment of Canadians to 
recognition and reform – or Reconciliation, in Australian and South African parlance. 
 
A ‘still small voice’ of Reconciliation in the form of Nunavut Premier Paul Okalik’s 
visit to Australia caught that country unaware in August 2001 (Okalik 2001a & 
2001b; Jull 2001b).  In the midst of the most florid and irrational debate on Australian 
indigenous policy of recent years – years of almost non-stop florid and irrational 
indigenous policy debate, it might be said – the Premier’s personal and political 
account of many difficulties and quiet triumphs of Inuit in Nunavut provided some 
much-needed calm and inspiration to the many persons who went to hear him or tuned 
in on TV.  It also gave a heartening glimpse of what a reconciled indigenous and non-
indigenous hinterland could look like and how its peoples could work together to 
solve problems which affected the whole. 
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4. Indigenous Internationalism 
 
Specific international influences have been important in Canada’s recent indigenous 
policy and political evolution.  For instance, American comments about Canadian 
failings towards Inuit in early Cold War years were annoying, even painful.  The 
American Arctic presence and criticism hurried Canada’s establishment of its 
Northern Affairs department in 1953. 
 
Decolonisation of the former British Empire provided constant images on Canada’s 
TV news of dark-skinned peoples fighting for freedom from the White Man and then 
winning it.  The Union Jack was lowered and new flags raised to replace it all over the 
world.  If poor fussy old England was doing ‘the right thing’, how much more should 
an idealistic New World country like Canada do? 
 
The riots, violence, and dysfunction of black-white relations in America especially 
affected Canadian TV watchers who knew or felt close to those cities.  Could such 
things really not happen in Canada?  Continuing failure by governments to address 
indigenous urban needs – or sheer bloody-mindedness by governments refusing moral 
and financial responsibility – may be Canada’s greatest social failure.  (The other is 
the Mid-North, i.e., provincial northlands which often escape media notice except in 
special cases as with the self-destructive children in Labrador indigenous villages.33) 
 
Even in the early 1970s it was typical for Canadian governments to assume that their 
political culture and way of life were universal, i.e., objective absolutes which would 
benefit ‘unfortunate’ and ‘backward’ people like Inuit and Indians once they stopped 
resisting and adopted them.  The word ‘acculturation’ had appeared often in Ottawa 
memos – a desirable process which would heal indigenous peoples when they became 
‘more like us’.  Very specific influences and inspirations for Canada were the Alaska 
Native claims settlement negotiated by indigenous leaders with Congress in 
Washington becoming law in 1971, followed by Inuit Greenland’s home rule 
movement resulting in political autonomy from May 1979.  However, a more active 
inter-action began.  In November 1973 the Arctic Peoples Conference in Copenhagen 
brought Inuit, Indian, and Métis notables from Northern Canada, and Sami from the 
three Scandinavian countries, together with Greenland Inuit assisted by the 
International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA), see Kleivan 1992; & Jull 
1998a.  This is usually considered the beginning of indigenous internationalism. 
 
Indigenous internationalism is the cooperation of indigenous peoples with each other 
across or beyond national borders to share ideas, information, and inspiration; to 
concert moral and political influence on national governments and international 
bodies; and to establish better international standards for themselves and other 
indigenous peoples in matters of shared or universal interest.  To date the main 
subjects of international attention by Canada’s indigenous peoples have been raising 
the level of indigenous rights observance by nation-state governments; establishing 
                                                           
33 Before, during, and after the November 27, 2000, federal election in Canada the desperate 
plight of Labrador’s Innu children and their no less bewildered parents became a national 
drama with community leaders going to the Prime Minister’s door, and with promises and 
confusion abounding.  The whole country was discussing these complex social and cultural 
problems, and in a mostly intelligent and caring way.  Canada has come a long way! 
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universal indigenous rights instruments (notably ILO Convention 169, and the Draft 
United Nations Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples); strengthening 
environmental safeguards for indigenous livelihoods and resources; opposing 
environmental campaigns directed at themselves, e.g., animal rights and anti-whaling; 
sharing experience for strengthening language and culture, and for dealing with social 
crises (e.g., alcohol abuse); and responding to specific disasters, e.g., Chernobyl 
radiation fallout in Scandinavian Sápmi or genocide in Guatemala. 
 
At that Copenhagen conference in 1973 the power of contact was evident.  Peoples 
remote and marginalised were represented by young (and one or two older) persons 
regarded as trouble-makers or quixotics at home.  They now met in the awe-inspiring 
Christiansborg Palace, for centuries the centre of Danish government, with welcoming 
Danish hospitality.  There was shock at discovering that other people in far places 
endured the same tragic and sometimes comic stupidities of the White Man’s 
governance, and understood perfectly the local and regional issues of social and 
cultural discrimination, political powerlessness, and environment and resource 
mismanagement by others, and laws wishing away centuries of indigenous rights and 
use.  Here, amid strange languages and manners, a recognition of shared needs and 
common causes took place, an outcome far more important and less explicit than any 
possible resolutions.  Not only did participants realise that however marginal and 
misunderstood they were at home, they were part of a larger world with others far 
away who understood their plight.  They could also share past victories and mistakes 
to help each other, and even reach public and official audiences who were more 
understanding and supportive (Jull 1998a; 1999). 
 
There was dramatic irony in the Christiansborg meeting.  The buildings and city were 
dimly lit and less than fully heated to conserve oil.  Weeks earlier the Danish prime 
minister’s support for Israel in the Arab-Israeli war had caused Arab countries to cut 
off oil so Danes were shopping in gloom and wearing extra sweaters.  The ‘frontier’ 
energy search of world oil companies and governments in remote regions such as the 
Circumpolar Arctic increased the pace of indigenous resistance and self-determination 
politics.  It had helped bring about this very conference.  Nobody then knew that this 
global oil shock was the end of the long post-1945 boom. 
 
Two further major developments flowed from the example of 1973.  Chief George 
Manuel of the Shuswap nation in British Columbia travelled the world and brought 
together many peoples on a Nuu-chah-nulth reserve at Port Alberni, BC, in late 1975 
to found the World Council of Indigenous Peoples, or WCIP (Manuel & Posluns 
1974; Sanders 1977).  Greenland Inuit, Sami, Maori, Australian Aborigines, North 
American Indians, many Indian peoples from Latin America, and others joined 
together for a week of the most intense discussion, debates, and all-hours talking, 
leavened with shared meals and cultural performances.  The level of pain and rage, 
and difficulties of translation – Norwegian, Spanish, and English were the conference 
languages – made for enormous strain and perhaps only the charismatic presence of 
the Iroquois spiritual leader Chief Oren Lyons brought peace and calm when 
explosions threatened.  Canadian first nations were rightly proud that their renowned 
leader, Chief Manuel, head of the National Indian Brotherhood (later renamed 
Assembly of First Nations), had achieved so much.  He turned the eyes of indigenous 
Canada outward, and international contact and studies blossomed.  A few years later 
during Canada’s indigenous constitutional work, Indian nations found it natural to 
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turn to extensive American Indian legal experience with rights, self-government, 
tribal sovereignty, and constitutional standing (and despite very different American 
and Canadian constitutional systems). 
 
In 1977, Alaskan Inuit invited Canadian and Greenland Inuit to Alaska’s 
northernmost point, Barrow, for the first Inuit Circumpolar Conference, or ICC.  For 
a remote and scattered people who had never in history or prehistory been reunited it 
was an astounding event (Lauritzen 1983).  Among other things Inuit adopted the 
same name, Inuit Circumpolar Conference, for the successor organisation, calling 
their 3-yearly meetings ‘general assemblies’.  In summer 1980 at ICC’s second 
assembly, in Nuuk, Greenland’s proud new ‘home rule’ capital, Inuit adopted a 
charter and working principles.  While the WCIP had the desperate plight of many 
Latin American Indian peoples as its central concern, Canadian Inuit demanded that 
ICC focus closer to home.  Mary Simon of Kuujjuaq (who later became ICC 
president) explained that Inuit had no experience wrestling with military dictators in 
hot countries and that such work would require the total effort of any organisation.  
Inuit should focus ICC on practical matters with liberal democratic governments in 
Ottawa, Copenhagen, and Washington to secure better policies.  In 1977 the Alaskan 
Inuit mayor Eben Hopson, Jr., had greeted prophetically the initial ICC gathering with 
the view that achieving maximum self-government in their home regions and the 
strongest possible marine and coastal environmental protection were the two great 
tasks for Inuit.  Since then political reform at home to achieve greater self-
government, and cooperation among themselves and with other peoples and 
international bodies on environment and sustainable development issues, have been 
unceasing in all Inuit regions.  An ICC compilation of standards or ‘Arctic policy’ 
was produced over many years through workshops, debate, and expert input, resulting 
in a document probably unique in the world and perhaps more widely used today 
outside the Inuit Arctic where its goals have been largely achieved (ICC 1992).  With 
growing experience Inuit international work has flourished and has even included aid 
feasibility projects in Melanesia and the Caribbean, while Inuit have been active in 
many international forums.  Mary Simon’s presidency of ICC achieved such impact in 
world environment work that she and ICC received significant national, foreign, and 
UN honours.  More recently Canadian Inuit-led emergency aid and self-help programs 
to Russia’s Inuit and other Northern peoples has captured public support at home and 
abroad. 
 
In 1983 the Alaskan Inuit used the ICC to create the Alaska Native Review 
Commission with Canadian judge Tom Berger of Mackenzie Valley pipeline fame as 
Commissioner.  The purpose of ANRC was to study the outcomes of the US 
Congress’ 1970 indigenous claims settlement and recommend improvements before 
parts of it were lost through a 20-year sunset clause.  Soon the other indigenous 
peoples of Alaska joined with Inuit and the remarkable inquiry visited the most 
remote corners of the State of Alaska as well as holding international expert week-
long round table sessions, all open to the public.  The final report quickly became an 
internationally respected book (Berger 1985) but also its conclusions presented to the 
US Congress and to the United Nations brought about legislative change.  The great 
mass of documentation and the transcripts could yield further books and these remain 
a potential international resource deposited in US and Canadian libraries. 
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The internationalising of Canadian indigenous awareness had profound impacts on 
indigenous political relations at home.  Governments had viewed indigenous regions 
and peoples as awkward little problems of local backwardness, a case of some 
‘primitive’ people being ‘slow’ to adopt superior white Canadian cultural ways.  
Canadian southern ways had not been in doubt.  Now, however, indigenous peoples 
were learning that their problems were typical of many other peoples in other 
hinterlands far away.  They no longer felt like mere powerless minorities facing 
strong government pressure to conform, but drew strength for their resistance from 
new friends.  They could learn tactics, strategies, and useful models or precedents 
from each other’s struggles, as well as support each other.  For their part, officials and 
advisers within governments began to see that imposing ethnocentric formulas on 
indigenous peoples was not only morally wrong and politically counter-productive, 
but created resentment, resistance, and problems – problems which were predictable 
across international borders (Jull 1991a).  Some also now saw less special wisdom 
and more simple bullying in past policy.  Comparative study up-ends policy 
assumptions and national pomposity.  The President of Iceland, himself a northern 
ethno-regions political analyst, has recently urged Canadians and the Arctic Council 
to expand such studies: 
 
[In the Circumpolar world] there is political innovation – we could even say 
political creation – that, in the last ten years, has dominated the evolution of 
the North.  New states have gained independence; increased rights have been 
given to local and regional institutions.  The decision-making structures are in 
a continuous flux and the classical question – Who governs, where and how? – 
now requires new answers, bringing into focus the nature of democratic 
accountability in the modern world.  We could even say that the North has 
become a working laboratory of new political institutions and relationships:  
local, regional, national and global. (Grimsson 2000, 111) 
 
The Circumpolar impact is unquantifiable.  The ‘empty North’ is no longer a 
forgotten ‘backyard’, but Canada’s window onto a new region of the planet.  
‘Illiterate’ and informal hunter-gatherers are de facto ambassadors34 and practitioners, 
moving easily and speaking fluently where national governments fear to tread.  Arctic 
political, social, economic, and environmental imperatives are those which indigenous 
peoples have been long proclaiming, and now ones which national governments – 
including the most powerful on earth – accept and help enforce.  The North is not a 
mere frozen expanse under which Soviet and American nuclear submarines chase 
each other, but home to living people with rich old cultures predating European 
nations and nationalities.  It is also a new field of action for Canada as a whole, thanks 
to Inuit initiative, and, unlike other multilateral opportunities, one in which Canada is 
a significant and increasingly enthusiastic player.  Inuit continue to lead Canada on 
many Arctic and global issues and, in good years, the federal government gives them 
funding to help.  Today, international precedents and contacts are a normal part of 
indigenous and governmental work, although indigenous peoples must continue to 
press for real action no less than ceremonial events (Jull 1999). 
 
 
                                                           
34 Meanwhile, one very literate Inuk, Mary Simon, has become Canada’s Ambassador to the 
Arctic and to Denmark. 
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As Milen says (1997, 3-4) in beginning his report to RCAP on indigenous electoral 
and other representation, 
 
Since the colonial period, various legal and political accommodations have 
been made within Confederation [in 1867] for linguistic, cultural, and 
religious minorities.  The same cannot truly be stated for the Aboriginal 
peoples of Canada – the Indian, Inuit and Métis peoples.  Aboriginal peoples 
have had a great struggle for recognition, protection and respect for their 
inherent rights.  Canada record, particularly in relation to First Nations, has 
been one of imposed policy on unwilling subjects of the state. 
 
Indigenous peoples in Canada have been working with the White Man’s formal 
mainstream political system as a collection of individuals for 40 years, i.e., since they 
were allowed to vote and since other constraints were removed.  By and large this has 
achieved little, although a useful adjunct to other processes in Northern Canada and 
occasionally in Southern Canada (Cameron & White 1995). 
 
However, indigenous peoples have worked with the White Man in war and peace – 
both against him and alongside him – for 400, or 500, or 1000 years as collectivities, 
depending whether one starts counting from Champlain’s lasting French settlements, 
the Cabot and Cartier era, or from Leif Eriksen.  As collectivities they have achieved 
everything positive in indigenous-white relations. 
 
Whether as skraelings to be fought or traded with by the Norse, or negotiating 
partners around the constitutional conference table with Prime Minister Trudeau and 
the premiers a thousand years later, the weight and persistence of indigenous 
numbers, and the determined indigenous defence of traditional territory, have been 
their political assets.  However, this has been a natural cultural response of shared 
belonging more than a considered or contrived strategy (e.g., Cassidy & Bish 1989). 
 
Even remote, scattered, and small groups of Inuit and other northern peoples beyond 
the reach of roads or mainstream media have shown that they can stand up to the 
collected expertise and political culture of the White Man to initiate and win crucial 
battles, e.g., in environmental conflicts and creation of Nunavut (Jull & Craig 1997; 
Jull 2000a).  The key to their success is sheer persistence.  Intelligent and positive 
tactics have also been a key for these small groups.  (For a check-list of successful 
Canadian Inuit practice recollected in hindsight see Kusugak 2000, Fenge 1994, 
Makivik 1995 & 2000, Jull 1991b.) 
 
Canada’s Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP) has provided a mass of 
useful background studies and a powerful volume of recommendations on ethno-
regional treaty-making (1996; 1997).  In many ways it is a fulfilment of the arguments 
and case studies in this report, but has not been dealt with in detail here because it 
remains largely undigested by governments and indigenous peoples themselves, not to 
mention the wider public in Canada.  It is undoubtedly the most important discussion 
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and blueprint available in the world today on indigenous rights and governance issues.  
One of its contributors, Tully (1995), has attracted wide scholarly interest by 
reconceptualising Western political philosophy through drawing on Canada’s recent 
indigenous-white relations experience. 
 
As with the indigenous nations who met the first Europeans, whether by the sea or 
inland, again today the Canadian Constitution and the entire constitutional structure 
and practice of Canada recognise and embrace indigenous peoples or nations (e.g., 
Abele 1999; Prince & Abele 2000; Abele & Prince 2001).  This is a moral and 
political fact.  It seems secure.  On November 27, 2000, all Canadians were able to 
vote in a national election on the Alliance party’s political program which includes 
the rejecting of indigenous peoplehood, rights, and exceptionalism, seeking to replace 
them with a fragmenting and assimilating uniformity.  The Alliance program was 
soundly defeated nationally.  Only in the far West – where a deeper agenda of 
alienation from Canada’s federal power-brokers carried the day, with indigenous 
issues only one of numerous voter grievances – was the Alliance vote strong.  Indeed, 
the whole Alliance strategy to win what votes it achieved was to under-communicate 
or deny its populist Right radicalism.  The election was amazing because won by a 
prime minister serving in cabinets for the past 35 years, a man apparently tired and 
prone to some recent faux pas.  Much of the Alliance vote was a generalised protest 
vote, e.g., in Ontario’s Ottawa Valley.  Nevertheless, Canadians understood the nature 
of the populist challenge and largely rejected it.  Prime Minister Chrétien articulated 
the issue clearly, firmly, and forthrightly.35  Canadians had a clear choice and decided 
on moral and philosophical grounds to reject new-minted liberal Right populism – just 
as they had overcome it in the 1860s to create the Canadian federation, and overcome 
it at other moments in even earlier Canadian history. 
 
Of course, the Alliance in coming years will find new ways and new policies to try to 
seduce voters, while trying to hide religious and political radicalism.  And of course 
Canada has seen other populist movements Left and Right blow out of the West and 
into national power equations.  But recent scare tactics, negative publicity for 
indigenous politics, economic uncertainties, and a government long in office and 
sometimes seeming rather tired were unable to prevail against accepted constitutional 
tradition.  Canada’s tradition embraces both individual rights and individual 
opportunity which are the great legacies of liberal and social democratic government, 
and collective identities of culture and region (Saul 1997; see also Girvetz 1977). 
 
The theoretical sources of indigenous identity and authority are of little political or 
constitutional interest.  Indigenous nations are facts, as King George III said they 
were.  Historians and philosophers could argue endlessly about the source of French 
or British or Canadian identity and governance.  It would be irrelevant.  For instance, 
was it the ‘genius’ of those closely related butter-haired tribes who settled England 
from AD 450, and were called Franks across the Channel? of Celtic peoples among 
whom they lived? of Norman organisation? of Christian religion? of Tudor or 
Cromwellian nationhood?  Does it matter?  No.  Whether the cultural background of 
Algonquian or Iroquoian peoples in Eastern Canada, or Inuit in the Arctic, that is their 
own business.  What matters is not to inspect each other’s souls or intellects but to 
make practical arrangements among settlers and indigenous governing bodies for 
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jurisdictional boundaries, territorial boundaries, public service funding, sharing or 
dividing powers, and mechanisms for resolving disputes.  For the rest, people can 
think what they like. 
 
Canada’s indigenous peoples have used ethnically-defined bodies of various sorts to 
press their political demands on governments.  Their objective is always the creation 
of local and regional bodies governing on a land base.  They have not sought 
structures like the Sami Parliaments or Australia’s national ATSIC,36 or a national 
treaty,37 and would not want those unless they were a supplement to their own local 
and regional governing structures.  Even the Inuit speaking dialects of a common 
language withdrew their leaders, staff, and advisers to their proper fields of action, 
power, and interest – the four regions of Labrador, Nunavik (Northern Quebec), 
Nunavut, and the Western Arctic – when they had achieved what they could through 
national organisation. 
 
Self-government or simply government in defined regions has been the main goal of 
Canada’s indigenous peoples.  At the beginning of the FMCs in the early 1980s there 
was a phase when organisation lawyers drafted putative bills of indigenous rights but 
after the first FMC in 1983 the focus of all indigenous groups became, and has 
remained, workable and properly funded governing institutions.  A further movement 
has now developed, especially among indigenous women, to demand that such 
institutions deliver better social outcomes and operate more transparently. 
 
Canada’s indigenous peoples and regions have things to share and various topics on 
which to combine usefully.  Sadly, Indians may visit Greenland but not the regions of 
their Inuit neighbours at home.  The moments of shared purpose and common 
understanding, such as the pan-indigenous Northern Canada delegation to the Arctic 
Peoples Conference, 1973, or Saskatchewan Indian-sponsored World Assembly of 
First Nations, 1982, are rare.  The Aboriginal Rights Coalition of November 1981 
saw Northern peoples – Yukon Indians, Métis, Dene, and Inuit – working closely and 
happily with Pacific First Nations, national indigenous women’s groups, national 
Métis and Non-Status Indians, and Atlantic regional peoples (Jull 1982).  There were 
also times of close cooperation among national leaders during the First Ministers 
Conferences of the 1980s.  Cooperation among Northern and Pacific coast peoples – 
Inuit, Indian, and Métis – during the life of the federal Coolican task force on claims 
experience and policy, producing an excellent report, was not repeated (Coolican 
1985).  In mid-1993 the four Inuit regions gathered with their self-government 
specialists at Pangnirtung at a closed workshop to share experience and ideas.  It was 
an exciting moment.  But after promising opening statements, some withdrew into 
‘confidentiality’ and refused to talk further, while all were persuaded to abandon the 
purpose of the workshop to produce a brief complaint to Ottawa.  (This was the brief 
                                                           
36 ATSIC combines a federal administrative agency with a national and regional set of elected 
indigenous councils to advise it.  Its successive heads – Lowitja O’Donoghue, Gatjil Djerrkura, 
and Geoff Clark – have proven to be effective spokespersons on the national scene and a 
thorn in the side of the federal government. 
37 As Russell and Jones report (1997, 32) to RCAP, ‘Among Aboriginal representatives, we 
found no support at all for a pan-Canadian, pan-Aboriginal “treaty” such as that envisioned by 
Premier Ghiz a few years ago.  Such a treaty is incompatible with the “nation-to-nation” 
relationship which First Nations wish to maintain with Canada.  They simply do not see 
themselves as part of a Canadian Aboriginal or Indian nation.  Designating a Canada-wide 
agreement as a “treaty” threatens their own sense of national identity.’ 
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interregnum of Ms Kim Campbell whose prime ministership ended in the electoral 
annihilation of her party.)38  If long-time Inuit and Inuit movement friends and 
associates will not speak privately together, cooperation looks unhopeful.  However, 
there is a clear need for Canada’s indigenous regional entities to work together and 
share experience, and work with others abroad, overlooking differences of culture and 
ideology, because nobody else has comparable experience (Jull 1999).  Meanwhile, a 
recent influential United Nations report on treaty areas is factually wrong and 
philosophically uncomprehending of actual progress in Canada and Greenland, 
ignoring valuable experience.39 
 
Political parties have a mixed history.  The Conservatives long held many indigenous 
voters’ support, not least for bringing them the vote.  The Liberals since Trudeau’s 
middle period have been more successful at winning and holding many indigenous 
voters.  The NDP should, by conventional thinking, be the logical home for 
indigenous votes and there have always been strong supporters of indigenous issues 
among NDP MPs.  In the indigenous constitutional crisis of 1981 it was bizarre that 
Tory and NDP leaders Clark and Broadbent backed away from real public support 
while Trudeau who was part of the problem, i.e., by giving in to the united premiers, 
was their best friend among Ottawa party leaders. 
 
The hold of parties is debatable.  The Liberals won over most Inuit leaders in the early 
1980s.  When this author asked one Inuit leader who held a formal Liberal party 
position in the Nunavut riding what he would do when Mulroney won the next 
election, as was almost certain, he replied as if the question were foolish, saying, 
‘Well, we’ll all become Conservatives!’  They did not, but Mulroney made no 
apparent attempt to win back the indigenous vote – perhaps its Western base was 
beyond his Quebec-based knowledge and he assumed it to be deep-dyed Liberal. 
 
The change of personnel and outlooks in government vis-à-vis indigenous peoples has 
also been significant.  Specifically, indigenous affairs have been treated for a very 
long time in Canada as a sort of lower-order social assistance function.  Indian people 
were in contact with junior officials with few powers and often little more than a plain 
man’s common sense about him.  (There were few ‘hers’ in those days.)  This began 
to change thanks to creation of the Northern Affairs department in 1953, flowering in 
the 1960s, but it became significant across the country with the Citizenship programs 
and their fallout in government contacts from the end of the 1960s, and in claims and 
constitutional work drawing in professional and high policy staff from the mid-1970s.  
Its was most dramatically noticeable with the first officials meetings with indigenous 
representatives in the 1982 lead-in to the First Ministers Conference of 1983.  Persons 
in officialdom who had little policy or other decision-making clout were being 
replaced by some of the best minds and most up-to-date thinkers in governments, to 
put it simply.  The latter had a very different outlook.  Usually they were less 
experienced with indigenous people and culture, but they were also more liberal and 
informed in their outlooks, both generally and in matters like discrimination, equality, 
                                                           
38 The voters were venting their rage at her mentor, Conservative Prime Minister Brian 
Mulroney, who had resigned in her favour. 
39 See especially paragraphs 129-130 and 135-146 in Study on treaties, agreements and 
other constructive arrangements between States and indigenous populations, Final Report, 
Unedited Version, by Miguel Alfonso Martinez, Special Rapporteur, United Nations, Geneva, 
1998. 
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etc.  They had a quite different set of interests and concerns, and indigenous 
organisations had to develop new expertise or hire new people to deal with them.40  
Service delivery and small help programs gave way to constitutional and even geo-
political concerns as a new kind of intellectual currency – not always achieving much 
good ‘on the ground’, it must be said. 
 
The NWT boasts that its non-party legislature is ‘consensus government’.  Nunavut 
has inherited this system.  The idea is that the consensual decision-making of 
indigenous peoples is better served without adversarial party confrontation in the 
legislature.  In the NWT, party development was delayed until Nunavut withdrew 
because the Nunavut members, both Inuit and non-Inuit, were a de facto party and the 
strongest in the legislature.  However, the attempt to formalise parties since has failed.  
Instead, the NWT sees a variety of members chosen as ministers by vote.  They then 
sit as a cabinet, united by nothing but a desire to get the biggest possible share of 
money available for their home community or district, money almost entirely raised 
by Ottawa and shovelled out to them in quantity.  Few democratic politicians are so 
lucky.  While the NWT government is excellent in its public services and programs, 
almost all designed for indigenous people, it has a harder time with large policy 
issues.  However, its long-time indigenous majority, and continuing division among 
the white towns, mean that its positions on indigenous issues are always well in 
advance of other jurisdictions.  Nunavut, of course, is the indigenous jurisdiction par 
excellence.  Unfortunately Yellowknife sometimes takes a negative attitude in the 
splitting of NWT agencies and budgets necessitated by creation of Nunavut, so 
relations may be frosty for some time and the concerted northern impact on national 
affairs dissipated. 
 
In the mid-1980s Nunavut seemed to have two proto-parties.  One was centred in 
western districts which was development-minded and might be thought of as thinking, 
‘Nunavut if necessary, but not necessarily Nunavut!’, especially if Beaufort Sea oil 
business spin-offs were on offer.  The other was centred on the eastern regions of 
Nunavut, was totally committed to Nunavut and reinforcing Inuit culture, with a more 
collective approach to development and society.  However, both NWT and Nunavut 
are unlike other governments in Canada.  But executive administration may be where 
the larger danger lies.  The problem for northern executives – high officials or 
ministers alike – is that many want to make their office so properly conventional, 
apart from a distinctive Northern logo, that it is accepted as equal by the meetings of 
officials or ministers in their field Down South, meetings which are very important in 
Canadian governance, i.e., executive federalism.  They see acceptance as equals in 
those forums as a sign of professionalism and excellence.  But that is a main reason 
why the NWT government failed indigenous peoples (and why they have since been 
pulling it apart, whether in Nunavut or the Mackenzie Valley).  They need to develop 
programs and policies suited to unique northern needs and then export those to others 
(as the native movement in Northern Canada did in politics, for instance). That takes 
confidence and courage, and some imagination.  The NWT went wrong from Day 
One by bringing in some top government person from a province and having him 
(usually a ‘him’) write NWT laws or policy in his field based on his province’s 
(possibly excellent) experience.  This was done to show Ottawa that Northern 
                                                           
40 Similar problems have arisen in Australia, for instance in the Torres Strait, see Jull P, 1994:  
‘Changing Political Contexts for Torres Strait:  New Realities and Necessary Techniques’, 
Paper for the Island Coordinating Council, Torres Strait, June 5, 1994. 
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government was competent and was therefore ready for more power and money to be 
transferred to Yellowknife.  It was understandable, but a mistake.  Nunavut must 
avoid repeating it. 
 
The tragedy of Canada has been that despite solemnly and ceremoniously making 
treaties with indigenous nations – processes which appear to have been conducted in 
good faith in the 18th and early 19th centuries by the British – later Canadian 
governments conducted them as ritual expedients (e.g., Allen 1992 and Fumoleau 
1975 respectively).  Some Canadian negotiators conducted pro forma rituals to silence 
Indian nations before filling their land with new settlers and projects.  However, in a 
curious way some of the old thinking was retained.  In the late 20th century 
governments have been content to ‘throw money at’ indigenous councils or other 
bodies and ask few further questions, a recognition of indigenous collective identity 
and autonomy.  Unfortunately communities have often been ill-prepared for such 
opportunities, and some notable indigenous leaders have blocked government funds 
until they were sure that organisations or communities had the capacity and personnel 
to manage them.  Such leaders’ point was that the legacy of failure in indigenous lives 
was a poison and one which should be prevented where foreseeable (e.g., Boldt 1993; 
Alfred 1999).  In recent years Canadian court decisions have begun to get back to the 
real meaning of indigenous-white treaties, sometimes with long overdue argument 
and respect as in the written judgment in Marshall 1990. 
 
Today a situation has arisen in Canada where there is great uncertainty about the 
extent of indigenous autonomy and its implications.  For instance, an Indian First 
Nation may not provide the same terms and conditions of employment for staff as for 
similar jobs in nearby towns or cities.  Such cases are already public issues in Canada.  
They raise questions for employees of the value and extent of autonomy and 
difference.  Indian staff may seek reasonable pay and benefits while their councils 
may view priorities differently.  Such disputes will become more common, with 
charges within Indian nations that leaders are looking after their own pay and power at 
the expense of humble employees.  Such matters will re-fuel white arguments that 
indigenous autonomy is a form of apartheid, however mischievous or wrong-headed 
such a view may be.  It is fortunate that Canada has already made some large progress 
on principles of contemporary indigenous-white relations, unlike Australia where not 
only do petty issues inflame national opinion against indigenous peoples but these are 
actively used by national and some state and territory parties to manipulate public 
opinion against blacks for electoral advantage.41 
 
                                                           
41 During the writing of this paper, The Ottawa Citizen (26-12-2000) reported that Canada’s 
national elected Indian chief is seeking a government-sponsored truth commission like that in 
South Africa to address the painful stories of indigenous victims of residential schools and 
similar matters as a healing measure.  In Australia such a commission held well-publicised 
hearings in 1995-97 and issued its powerful report which reduced tough politicians to tears.  
However, the Howard government treated the tales and report with disdain, see Jull P, 1998c.  
For general Australian indigenous scene, markedly different from Canada, see Jull & Bennett 
2000, and Jull & Rutherford 2000. 
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Observations and Conclusions – or – EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Some general observations and conclusions may be made about Canada’s post-1945 
experience.  These refer to the whole country, including but by no means exclusive to 
the specific cases sketched in this paper. 
 
1. Indigenous peoples in Canada over the past 35 years have not joined in the 
existing national political system so much as they have enlarged, modified, 
remedied, and renewed it in the process of seeking to deal with grievances, needs, 
and aspirations, and to accommodate new political and constitutional structures.  
Practical changes have been most evident in vast hinterlands where new structures 
have been negotiated with land (and sea) claims.42 
 
2. Indigenous peoples have achieved positive and unforeseen outcomes by 
determination, innocence, occasional bloody-mindedness, good fortune, and 
reference to stated Canadian and European ideals – and by gaining the support and 
capturing the imagination of important elements of non-indigenous opinion. 
 
3. The process has been a de facto negotiation – and sometimes a formal one as in 
land claims, self-government, and constitutional work – through official, 
indigenous, and general public understanding evolving through public debate, 
media reportage and comment, specialist and expert reports, court decisions, 
normal processes of liberal democratic politic life, international cooperation, and 
foreign scrutiny.  It has often been angry, bitter, and confrontational, but rarely 
violent – its character as ‘negotiation’ often visible only in hindsight. 
 
4. Canada’s indigenous peoples have had full access as individuals to elections, 
parties, and the national political system for 40 years at most.  Indigenous 
locations, small numbers, culture, and distance from Canadian socio-economic 
norms make many of them marginal participants today.  Elections and elected 
persons have gained some symbolic moments, a push along for Nunavut, one 
1990 constitutional veto, and almost no power. 
 
5. Indigenous peoples have been political collectivities vis-à-vis the White Man in 
Canada implicitly and explicitly for 400 years (or 1000, strictly speaking), and 
continue to be so today.  Group identity and cohesion have been the main reasons 
for any benefits and influence they have gained. 
 
6. The absence of indigenous people in electoral politics, legislatures, or the rest of 
the dominant political system was undoubtedly a factor in bad policy and neglect.  
This was a rationale for Citizenship funding of indigenous voices through political 
associations outside legislatures from the late 1960s. 
 
7. Many indigenous people do not vote or participate in political affairs beyond their 
own community because such activity incurred loss of Indian status in times past.  
The Indian Act was designed ‘to get rid of’ Indians, expelling them from their 
cultures and demanding that they break with their own people to keep ‘benefits’ 
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Australians.  Australia’s agreements to date involve much less than the Canadian ones. 
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such as voting rights.  Inuit voting in their homeland have had the highest voter 
turnouts in Canada – much higher than non-indigenous people. 
 
8. Today indigenous people in some areas have discovered the utility of 
‘mainstream’ elections and party politics.  They are prepared to use these as an 
adjunct or follow-up to their collective agendas – not as a replacement. 
 
9. A recent estimate that c. 45 (of 301) seats in Ottawa’s House of Commons have 
electorally significant indigenous voter numbers may encourage indigenous 
electoral activity. 
 
10. Devastating interference in indigenous lives and families by government, as well 
as the policy assault accompanying its Victorian religious and social values – and 
the Victorian Age lasted till c. 1970 in much of indigenous Canada – have made 
most indigenous people wary of governments and governance, even of their own. 
 
11. Indigenous political entities such as political associations and claims bodies have 
operated at arm’s length from government and less formally than similar bodies 
such as the Sami Parliaments.  Nevertheless, they have not been disadvantaged in 
comparison with those structures, even re-negotiating the national Constitution 
with Prime Ministers and Premiers. 
 
12. The rejection to date of political parties in the Northwest Territories and Nunavut 
in the name of a ‘consensus’ style of government has not necessarily been an 
advantage to indigenous or non-indigenous voters.  A more immediate concern 
may be the importation of Southern Canada executive and administrative styles 
and structures, the very reason the old NWT alienated indigenous peoples. 
 
13. National indigenous associations in Canada are secondary political forums and 
have roles their roles delegated to them by primary indigenous regional or local 
political communities.  National consensus was easy when a few large grievances 
were widely shared, but the situation is more complex and varied today. 
 
14. Indigenous peoples have had four sequential and overlapping political phases vis-
à-vis government since 1945, namely passive resistance, strong advocacy of rights 
to deal with wrongs, negotiation with the White Man implicitly or explicitly of 
new governing frameworks, and a reform movement often led by women 
demanding more outcomes, less rhetoric, and better practice in new frameworks 
(the last two of which phases should be cumulative, not opposed to each other). 
 
15. Indigenous political strategies and tactics have been too varied to be simplified, 
but one pair of supposed polar opposites is often noted by participants themselves.  
This is the hardline insistence on sovereignty and reluctance to make pragmatic 
agreements of some First Nations, notably in ‘Treaty Indian’ regions such as the 
Prairie provinces, vs. the more accommodating and practical outcomes-oriented 
approach of Northern peoples, notably Inuit.  The actual differences in aim and 
style have been overstated, have seen both tendencies and the peoples espousing 
them demonised by others, and have spilled unhelpfully, unnecessarily, and 
irresponsibly into international forums where they have spread an image of ‘ugly 
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Canadians’ and held overseas peoples hostage to domestic feuds.  And so the 
polarity has become a political ‘fact’, mythical or not. 
 
16. Indigenous nations have experienced a paradoxical relationship with white 
authority, the dysfunction of many indigenous communities today resulting from 
official aloofness in some matters no less than interference in others.  As a result, 
indigenous reformers such as women’s and ‘accountability’ movements are often 
driven by unfulfilled hopes of equality and social improvements within indigenous 
society following from greater indigenous-white equality reforms achieved earlier 
without adequate preparation or capacity-building. 
 
17. Canada’s indigenous political and constitutional cultures have been evolving 
steadily in themselves and vis-à-vis dominant non-indigenous political culture 
since the mid-1960s.  This flow modifies, gives meaning to, and is modified by 
each new element.  Canadian experience misleads those abroad who seek single 
events or single documents as applicable ‘solutions’. 
 
18. Successful constitutional politics require visible integrity and authenticity of 
processes to arrive at reforms or structures which will be acceptable and workable.  
One might almost say that process becomes product.  To date the Canadian 
constitutional reforms both at national or land claims level have been unique with 
both sides learning along the way.  Whether in future other groups can take a 
model off the shelf and fill in a form remains to be seen.  The drama, vehemence, 
large or heroic personalities, and great battles of principle which have 
characterised indigenous-white constitutional and political reforms since the 
1960s would surely be less likely.  That may or may not represent progress. 
 
19. The indigenous peoples who have achieved most, politically, in post-1945 years 
have not adopted either/or approaches of high-level constitutional change or local 
community development but have worked at many levels simultaneously, e.g., the 
Nunavut and Nunavik (Arctic Quebec) Inuit through national Constitutional 
reform, territorial/provincial constitutional reform, court cases, native title claims, 
interventions in regulatory and inquiry processes, regional and local governance 
bodies, local study and research efforts (e.g., hunting and ecologically sustainable 
development needs and realities), and community projects. 
 
20. Canada’s process-oriented mainstream political and constitutional culture, e.g., 
use of devices such as political accords, seems to be congenial to resolving deep 
divisions and bitter past histories in indigenous-white relations. 
 
21. More generally, Canada’s use of impersonal processes and structural reforms has 
provided intelligent and dispassionate problem-solving.  The value of this would 
go unnoticed but for Australia’s recent experience of a negative and emotional 
public debate conducted largely in one-liners and stereotypes.43 
 
22. Constitutional work has focused the shift occurring in the official ‘centre of 
gravity’ for indigenous policy and related governmental personnel from low-order 
                                                           
43 While Australian parties and governments make merry with prejudice and faulty history, 
Aboriginal leaders have maintained dignity and attempted to develop a consensus and 
framework for progress (Jull 2000c; Jull & Kajlich 2001). 
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welfarism to high policy and politics.  From the late 1960s, and especially from 
the mid-1970s, this has massively upgraded the importance of indigenous affairs 
in the Canadian body politic, while often placing tough demands on poor 
indigenous groups lacking personnel to cope with such new official cultures. 
 
23. Not the least importance of the opening of the Constitution to indigenous peoples 
in 1978 – after which the process led to face to face conferences of indigenous 
leaders, the Prime Minister, and Premiers – was to break the mould of dismal 
indigenous-white relations and paternalistic government programming, a sort of 
psychological breakthrough to provide hope in an indigenous social reality of too 
much accumulated hopelessness. 
 
24. The substance and eloquent rhetoric of historic decisions in the Supreme Court of 
Canada, beginning with Hall’s famous dissent in Nishga, a.k.a. Calder, 1973, 
through Guerin, 1984, Sioui and Sparrow both in 1990, and more recently 
Delgamuukw, 1997, and Marshall, 1999 – and in recent weeks the 3-0 Powley 
decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in which a people were ‘discovered’ at 
last and recognised by the law, while the historical record of governments at all 
levels was chastised – have provided moral and legal bedrock of political and 
constitutional change.  The basic theme is respect between and among peoples. 
 
25. Essentially Canada has now cleared constitutional and political ‘space’ for 
indigenous government as a third order alongside federal and provincial (or 
territorial) government.  It was one of the least contentious parts of the 
Charlottetown Accord process which failed in a national referendum of 1992.  It 
may now be achieved piecemeal and confirmed through constitutional 
amendments later. 
 
26. Federal and even some provincial governments, and the courts, have been leading 
non-indigenous opinion on indigenous policy in recent decades.  This is the 
responsible approach of a nation-state to long-standing injustice, deep social ills, 
and volatile disadvantaged national minorities in its midst, aided by greater cross-
cultural understanding in society and a willingness to face up to the past.  Until the 
mid-1970s or later, governments were reluctant to accept indigenous agendas, or 
simply ignored them.  The basic factor driving all this has been indigenous 
determination to improve their lot and maintain their culture. 
 
27. Indigenous peoples themselves have sometimes been unable or unwilling to take 
up opportunities offered for real change – usually because of longtime 
powerlessness, disadvantage, lack of education, and resulting lack of confidence.  
Not all political and policy failures since the 1970s have been governmental. 
 
28. Jurisdictional and physical boundaries of indigenous communities are permeable.  
An infinite number of ‘simple’ matters, e.g., clerical pay on-reserve compared 
with outside pay and conditions, have potential to fuel local disputes, negative 
images, and odious comparisons. 
 
29. The religious or cultural origins of Anglophone, Francophone, Inuit, Métis, or 
Indian nations are not and should not be a matter for dispute.  The existence of 
these nations is a fact.  The only issues for constitutional negotiation need be 
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practical ones of governance, boundaries, and dispute resolution – on top of basic 
fiscal and economic impacts, of course. 
 
30. Indigenous customary law has received too little attention in Canada despite being 
paid lip-service in various statements and reports.  Indigenous women would have 
to be fully involved in restoring it.  Indigenous governments would have to meet 
international standards of human rights like all other governments. 
 
31. Canada’s legal and constitutional background is often seen abroad now as 
uniquely advantaging indigenous peoples, but any such halcyon days are very 
recent and result from indigenous political pressure.  Indigenous-white relations 
have been determined by broad social and political events and eras, with legal and 
constitutional safeguards effective when the times have been right. 
 
32. The principal Canadian political ‘advantage’ for indigenous peoples has been 
federal jurisdiction which, albeit often consigning them to oblivion, has provided 
what protection they have had from provincial land and resource development 
interests.  This is an element of the national system working properly if not always 
well.  Nunavut is another example of federal principles, with Inuit language and 
cultural difference protected by federal and Constitutional enactments, while the 
region shares in revenues and opportunities of an affluent nation-state.  However, 
the largest indigenous people, Métis and non-status Indians, have been largely left 
out of federal arrangements, while being often marginalised by provincial 
governments, too, so Powley, 2001, must become a starting-point for change. 
 
33. A breakthrough was federal funding of indigenous political associations 
regionally and nationally from c. 1969 on a multi-year block funding basis (to 
avoid real or apparent political interference from governments under attack from 
those associations).  The practical and vocal outcome was that indigenous peoples 
regained the ear of government after 150 years.  Denied access to legislatures and 
parties in practice, now those bodies met able indigenous people and began to 
recruit them for parties and elections. 
 
34. Indigenous politics have resulted in concrete modifications of governing systems, 
e.g., the impact of indigenous claims and environmental research on policy form 
and substance validating indigenous traditional ecological knowledge (TEK) and 
embodying it in new administrative structures sharing power with governments in 
resource management, land use planning, regulation of development, parks, etc. 
 
35. Indigenous rural and hinterland reactions to hydro-electric power, mining, oil and 
gas, military, settlement, non-indigenous fishing and hunting, and other projects or 
activities have provided a firm base for much of the environmental awareness of 
Canadians in general in recent decades.  Rather than simply a fashionable 
occupation of urban élites, as is sometimes caricatured, environmental knowledge 
has been thus linked to daily food and livelihood needs, and to social and cultural 
survival. 
 
36. Proper environmental standards in hinterlands have been largely achieved by the 
determination of poor illiterate isolated hunter-gatherers rather than scientists, 
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experts with glossy booklets, or powerful government ministries.  Collective 
political will makes all the difference. 
 
37. Since 1945, Canadians in the North have faced the same initial challenges for 
white settlement as faced the first Europeans in the Americas, notably indigenous 
relations, environmental understanding, and creation of new political structures 
and societies.  They have arrived at very different solutions than did the 19th or 
early 20th centuries by seeking accommodation between natives and newcomers. 
 
38. The White Man carries his aspirations to create a conventional political structure 
into indigenous hinterlands and can appeal to national liberal traditions to overrule 
or ignore indigenous customs and imperatives, e.g., as in Canada’s indigenous 
rebellions in 1869 and 1885, and in northern territories for many years after 1945. 
 
39. An active national government and strong constitutional framework are needed to 
protect indigenous peoples and broker genuine political accommodations in such 
hinterlands.  No sub-national settler government anywhere has done this 
voluntarily or adequately beyond a few fleeting moments, e.g., enlightened 
premiers in Manitoba or South Australia. 
 
40. Indigenous peoples prefer even dysfunctional and isolated communities of their 
own to trusting unreformed white-dominated territory or other sub-national 
governments. 
 
41. The indigenous constitutional success story unfolding across the country and 
especially in the northern 75% of Canada is more a happy haze than detailed 
picture to most Canadians.  Successful recent Canadian policies have been slowly 
and often grudgingly achieved by trial and error, or trial and furore, more often 
than by design. 
 
42. But successes have been achieved, to the credit of all Canada.  Sometimes the lack 
of public interest has been helpful, and indigenous determination – always.  As the 
Nisga’a Treaty uproar shows, public understanding can be limited, and public 
interest, unhelpful.  The need for constitutional education and explanation is great. 
 
43. In Western Canada, and non-indigenous Canada at large, some people are moving 
towards talkback radio and tabloid newspaper democracy, confusing equality with 
uniformity.  Most of the indigenous political reforms achieved over the past 35 
years are under attack by the Canadian Alliance, the main federal Opposition. 
 
44. Northern successes have occurred despite unhelpful national hinterland and 
development policies.  Now that the new system is proven, more supportive 
policies should be put in place.  Debates over diamond mines and infrastructure 
projects in the region of the Denendeh-Nunavut border have an air of déja vu. 
 
45. The failure of British and Canadian authorities to honour treaties signed with 
indigenous peoples in the spirit in which they were negotiated is the most tragic 
failure of Canadian history and has poisoned indigenous-white relationships and 
trust from coast to coast to this day.  The most basic element in that failure was 
that the solemnity of respect offered by the indigenous side was not reciprocated 
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later by the whites whose greed for lands and removal of tribes became the all-
consuming feature of the White Man’s frontier. 
 
46. Indigenous Canada is experiencing a renaissance built on nationhood and other 
ethno-regional notions – the best way forward, as the Royal Commission on 
Aboriginal Peoples advocates.  Three quarters of Canada was ‘all equal and the 
same’, as an Australian populist would say, with indigenous peoples ignored and 
impoverished; now a better approach sees much of the country ‘all equal and 
different’. 
 
47. In the late 1960s northern indigenous leaders were patronised by southern 
indigenous organisations, but within a few years northern Inuit, Dene, Métis, and 
Yukon Indian personalities were highly visible national political leaders.  It is 
tempting to speculate that indigenous politicians with more fluid politico-legal 
contexts in which to innovate or negotiate, e.g., in northern hinterlands, have been 
the most successful reformers.  This bolsters the conclusions of RCAP that 
negotiating northern-style regional frameworks across Canada breaking free of 
past policy and statutory shackles would be the most promising national policy. 
 
48. In the 1973 Arctic Peoples Conference, 1975 World Council of Indigenous 
Peoples founding, 1977 Inuit Circumpolar Conference founding, and 1982 World 
Assembly of First Nations, Canada’s indigenous peoples became initiators of 
indigenous internationalism.  This outlook widened and validated indigenous 
agendas at home, and altered perceptions of indigenous peoples and peoples’ 
perceptions of themselves.  It also transformed the northern 75% of Canada from 
passive national hinterland to international zone of innovation and action. 
 
49. Implicit and explicit comparisons between Canada and other countries in 
indigenous politics and policy reinforced the validity of indigenous aspirations 
and resistance in official and many other white eyes.  They also reminded 
Canada’s Anglophone and Francophone leaders and communities that their own 
political cultures were specific developments arising from particular contexts – 
not universal truths as many politicians and officials believed. 
 
50. Indigenous peoples everywhere have similar aspirations, although styles or 
rhetoric differ.  They have only each other from whom to learn and improve the 
‘political science’ and ‘public administration’ of their renewal and self-
determination.  They should cooperate internationally in political studies, 
exchanges, and mutual support much more than at present. 
 
51. An overall indigenous political culture in Canada exists and is evolving steadily 
today (and may be seen by outsiders as a sum of parts such as those enumerated 
here), in addition to many re-emerging and even new local and regional 
indigenous political cultures.  At the same time, Canada’s overall culture, 
including its political culture, is modified and expanded by inter-action with the 
indigenous renaissance.  Big pictures and big policy settings are encouraging.  
Canada’s governments and social, economic, and cultural establishment must 
explain the constitutional, legal, moral, and commonsense imperatives behind 
indigenous self-determination to all Canadians.  The past failure to do so in 
respect of Quebec should be a stark warning of the dangers of not doing so. 
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Final Comments 
 
Two final points may be made.  Indigenous-government negotiations – whether on 
land/sea claims, self-government, the environment, Constitution, or anything else – 
have been accompanied by assiduous and sometimes ostentatious public information 
and communication work to assist public understanding.  However, the real work of 
negotiation has been done more quietly.  Non-indigenous officials or contract experts, 
and indigenous representatives and their ‘white advisers’, are demonstrating that the 
political and constitutional system is flexible enough to enhance and even to celebrate 
the diverse ancient cultures of North America no less than those more recently arrived 
from Europe.  Talking in rented meeting rooms in no-longer-fashionable city hotels, 
or walking weary at sunset along a lonely Arctic beach chatting with someone from a 
very different Canada after a long day of argument and legalisms – one meeting 
Down South, the next Up North – non-indigenous and indigenous Canadians working 
with a ‘willing suspension of disbelief’ are creating a new Canada.  Those of us who 
have been part of that process have been privileged.  Few will ever see their names in 
the press or win recognition.  All this is far from the false prophets of talkback radio 
or tabloid press shouting demands for uniformity.  One may learn more from Classical 
Greek tragedians about such demagoguery – its message, evils, demise – than from 
some of our think-tanks.44 
 
The second point is that despite persistent and insistent indigenous disadvantage, and 
accumulated indigenous grievances, the Canadian politico-constitutional system has 
proven remarkably responsive and flexible in the past 40 years in adapting to embrace 
indigenous peoples and their nations, villages, and scattered bands.  Yes, of course, all 
of us involved have been frustrated and have boiled over at delays and stupidities – 
more times than we might like to remember.  But looking back I doubt that any of 
those involved could have believed realistically that Canadian society, Canadian 
culture, and Canadian politics could or would travel so far in two short generations.  
The point is that indigenous peoples should not for a moment believe that the system 
is unchanging or unchangeable.  They have changed it and are continuing to change it.  
Non-indigenous people, for their part, must realise that there is no cause for 
smugness.  Having long been marginalised or forgotten by the White Man’s system, 
the indigenous people now making such creative use of it can demand the best it can 
offer and will be more than able to insist on getting it.  These are second- or third-
class citizens no longer. 
 
At present many indigenous and non-indigenous reformers fear that progress has 
stalled in Canada.  Local issues of equality confused with uniformity, and the 
inevitable messes and mistakes which will occur as new indigenous structures take on 
old and new roles, create noise which the faint-hearted and unsympathetic represent 
as chaos, danger, and division.  The strongest political policy opposition has been 
coming from the Right and while public authorities have grown cautious they remain 
helpful on some large issues (e.g., Jull 2001a).  However, within the indigenous 
                                                           
44 As I wrote recently of Australian politics, ‘What is needed most is political leadership 
founded on knowledge and principle, not putdowns and simplification.  The stage tragedies of 
Classical Greece, the first known democratic age, are shrewd and unsentimental about the 
weakness and fickleness of choruses of public opinion, but they all end with public support 
flowing back to moral leadership and higher values, away from transient tyrants projecting 
their personal failings onto politics.’ (Jull 2000c) 
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movement, especially the women’s and ‘accountability’ groups, there has been an 
urgent call for reform within the workings of self-government and self-management.  
And while indigenous leaders rightly seek and demand immediate action on the more 
expansive promise of 40 years of indigenous reform, the White Man’s authorities 
often find it more comfortable, more manageable, and more successful to work with 
smaller increments.  My own view is that the present is at worst a pause, not a halt.  
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